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ABSTRACT 
 Disease has contributed to the reshuffling of the regional and global orders 
throughout history. Strangely, this variable has been neglected vis-à-vis Great Power 
Competition (GPC), creating a “plague gap” in the literature on international relations 
and transitions of power. In general, historians and political scientists connect power 
shifts to military clashes, diplomacy, or economic developments. Investigating the 
emergence and spread of novel diseases throughout time offers a new variable to the 
discussion. My findings explore how disease has factored into the decline of some 
empires (the Athenian, Roman, Byzantine, and Mongol empires) and the expansion of 
others (Spain and Great Britain). In GPC disease can be used as an instrument of 
conquest or as a collaborative tool of governance. Disease can weaken states’ abilities to 
compete economically and militarily with rivals. The ongoing GPC with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) 
pandemic provides yet another example of this pattern. My research suggests the 
possibility that COVID-19 will accelerate Chinese superiority and reshape the 
international order in the PRC’s favor. Consideration must be given to the inclusion of 
disease in determining national policy in GPC. 
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This thesis assesses the effect(s) of disease on regional and global competitions 
resulting in power transitions. Traditionally, power shifts are measured mainly by political, 
economic, and military capabilities and resources in the international system. The 
foundational efforts to understand power shifts rely on international relations models, like 
the Balance of Power Theory, as the baseline for measurement and transition of power. 
Balance of Power Theory emphasizes the deterrence of a state that strived to use its power 
to control others. At the conceptual level, this is sound logic, but the effects of disease are 
generally not factored into the equation. The inclusion of disease as a sometimes-decisive 
factor may help us understand how and why great powers lose out or gain ground. Disease 
is not limited to historical empires; it has persisted in modern times and will likely continue 
well into the future. The current COVID-19 pandemic showcases the power of disease in 
a globalized world despite revolutionary medical practices.  
A. THE PLAGUE GAP 
By and large, the literature on international relations predicts that power shifts will 
occur by way of economic, political, and/or military means, but has excluded disease from 
the calculus. Arguments from international relations authorities such as John Mearsheimer 
contend the power for a state is a function of economic and military capabilities to influence 
great power controls, completely excluding disease.1 Other international relations theorists 
share the same sentiments, such as Inis Claude and Kenneth Waltz. Along the same lines, 
historian Paul Kennedy asserted that nations and empires tend to overextend themselves 
militarily and economically, which leads to power shifts.2 This exclusion of disease as a 
variable has created a “plague gap” in the power politics literature. Other historians write 
about the effect of disease on populations, but failed mention power transitions associated 
 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated edition. (New York: 
WWNorton & Company, 2014), 55. 
2 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), xv–xvi. 
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with the outbreak. Jared Diamond and William McNeill wrote extensively about disease 
throughout the history of man and linked disease as a tool of decline.  
This thesis will fill the “plague gap” with historical and current examples of disease 
and nation competition. Establishing the place of disease among economic and military 
means to shift power provides another measure and can help answer how regional and 
international orders rise and fall. 
B. KEY ARGUMENTS 
This thesis captures the ways in which disease has affected power throughout 
history. The main findings of the research have uncovered a trend in power transition 
enabled by disease. It makes three major arguments. The first: disease can stop the 
expansion of economic and military power. Territorial and commercial expansion has been 
a basis of power but also as a means of disease transmission—as is evident with Greece 
and Rome. Expansion fueled trading, and the movement of goods associated with trade as 
well as troops to protect the growth, connecting the classical world.3 These increased 
movements also introduced novel diseases to the empire’s population with often volatile 
outcomes.4 The introduction of smallpox into Ancient Athens and the bubonic plague into 
the Byzantine Empire are examples.  
Second, disease can assist expansion when a population is immune. Leveraging the 
immunity, states expand into uncharted territories, decimated the locals and swung the 
power pendulum in favor of the colonizer or aggressor. During the colonialization of the 
Americas, the European colonizers utilized the lessons of the “military revolution” against 
the people of the New World.5 The accompaniment of disease and, when combined with 
the military revolution, profoundly affected the conquests in the New World. The Spanish 
 
3 William Hardy McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 1st ed (Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Books Editions, 
1976), 113–15. 
4 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Norton, 2017), 
81–108. 
5 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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utilized disease in the defense of Havana, while Lord Jeffrey Amherst weaponized 
smallpox, spreading it to the Native Americans. 
Lastly, collaboration on or offer of humanitarian and medical aid spurs the 
possibility for cooperation. In the twentieth-century, medical technological breakthroughs 
provided the belief that infectious disease had lost its power over humanity.6 This 
motivated collaboration by unlikely Great Powers led to the eradication of one disease 
(smallpox) and set forth organizations to fight for disease prevention globally. However, 
disease control benefited those with available resources and furthered the GPC. The wealth 
of a nation greatly determined the response to an outbreak and the ability to offer support 
to other, less fortunate nations. In the twenty-first century, two novel outbreaks of disease 
from China demonstrate this tension. The PRC’s ability to conceal the exact toll of disease 
on its society allows for powerful messaging to outside observers. As with smallpox, a 
global threat united the world and incentivized cooperation, but also drove GPC. In these 
instances, China emerged first and provided assistance the world desperately needed, filled 
the void left by other Great Powers engulfed in their struggles.  
C. METHODOLOGY  
In order to fill the “plague gap” in literature, this thesis first researched international 
relations theorists and historians to identify the lack of disease inclusion into power shifts. 
To fill this gap, historical case studies in which disease altered power were chosen and then 
grouped into chapters based on effects and the era of occurrence. The focus on only one 
specific conflict or a single period would be too narrow for this project’s scope. The 
vignettes offer historical samples of plague-induced power shifts from the perspective of 
both primary and secondary sources. The evolution of a disease in power transitions 
throughout history filled the “plague gap,” which had previously excluded it from the 
Balance of Power theories and other historical sources. 
 
6 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 9. 
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D. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
This thesis focuses on historical examples where disease caused or contributed to 
the decline of a regional influencer or a Great Power. Following the introduction, the 
second chapter, “Plague Gap in Power Politics,” describes the Balance of Power Theory 
and the prospect to consider disease as a variable. The use of numerous political scientists’ 
work in the chapter charted how military, economic, and political factors, but not disease, 
contributed to power shifts. The second part shifts to historians and their coverage of 
disease. These writings demonstrate the debilitating effects of disease on populations, but 
do not relate those effects to power transitions.  
The rest of the thesis spans from the ancient world to the present. The third chapter, 
“Old World Imperialism,” includes empires from the ancient world. The Athenian, Roman, 
Byzantine, and Mongol Empires each have extensive documentation on disease and the 
power shifts that resulted. In each case, expansion introduced disease. The logistical 
requirements for trade served as the facilitator for germ introduction into susceptible 
populations. The decline in the economy and military of the empires by disease set forth a 
shift in regional supremacy. 
The fourth chapter, titled “Colonization and Competition Between Great Powers,” 
examines the discovery of a “New World” by European colonizers. The ability of imperial 
powers to use disease—whether intentional or not—against the local populace accelerated 
the gains in power. Disease factored into the conflicts that occurred between European 
powers in the New World as well. The established power in the region held immunities 
over its rivals and provided an advantage in local battles—notably in the case of Havana 
(1762). 
The fifth chapter, “Twentieth-Century International Power Relations and Global 
Cooperation,” encompasses pandemics and the successes achieved by global cooperation. 
Medical achievements in the twentieth century allowed governments to eliminate disease 
in one case and control disease, but only if the nation had the resources. The emerging and 
underdeveloped countries lack the ability to fund these endeavors and rely on the 
 
5 
willingness of superpowers to assist. That motivation drove collaboration, in the case of 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but frictions remained because of the Cold War animosities.  
The sixth chapter, “Twenty-First Century Pandemics: A Change in the International 
Order?,” comprises of two novel diseases that spread from China, accelerated by 
globalization and the lack of information from the Chinese government. Despite the 
modern advances in medicine, the diseases disrupted everyday governmental, business, 
and societal functions. China’s ability to recover first from the outbreaks put it in an 
advantageous position to assist recovery and accelerate the rise of China economically and 
its improved image as a responsible, effective government. 
The research reveals that disease has been a significant causal variable in power 
transitions along with economic and military terms. On this basis, I recommend the 
inclusion of disease in any future literature on the subject. Additionally, revisions or 
additions should be made to previous writings on the topic to include disease as an equal 
variable. Political scientists and historians need to emphasize the importance of disease to 
ruling governments to include disease as a factor in national policy. Understanding how 
disease has impacted our predecessors remains essential as the world becomes more 


















II. PLAGUE GAP IN POWER POLITICS 
The combination of alliance politics and military capabilities forms the basis of the 
Balance of Power Theory. Simply put, “a balance of power involves a particular 
distribution of power among the states for that system such that no single state and no 
existing alliance has an ‘overwhelming’ or ‘preponderant’ amount of power.”7 The 
Balance of Power Theory does not view states in the international system as equals and is 
in line with a realist view, which focuses upon differentials in relative power between 
competing nation-states and alliances.8 States use their power, both political and military, 
to check other states and maintain their relative advantages and security.  
What occurs with the introduction of a disease into this system? How will it affect 
the state’s capabilities and its ability to compete in the international system? The imbalance 
caused by a large-scale, prolonged pandemic on a state’s economy may tip the balance of 
power to the state that can recover the quickest. Whether a state is independent or 
dependent on other states may affect the decrease or increase of power post-plague. These 
critical questions remain relevant throughout the examples discussed in the process of this 
thesis.  
A. POWER AND POLITICS 
Typically, social scientists and historians have researched power in terms of 
economic and military resources and capablities. For example, Hans Morgenthau’s book, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948) addresses, supports, 
and critiques numerous theories about power. He primarily supports and focuses on realism 
theory regarding power and its interaction with other nations globally.9 Foreign and 
 
7 Dina A. Zinnes, “An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories,” Journal of Peace 
Research 4, no. 3 (September 1, 1967): 272, https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336700400304. 
8 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History & Theory (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: 
Routledge, 2004), 8, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203344613. 
9 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New 
York: Knopf; by Random House, 1972), 3–15. First edition was published in 1948. See also “Democracy 
and Efficiency” by Woodrow Wilson.  
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domestic politics reveal three basic patterns: states try either keeping power, increasing 
power, or demonstrating power.10 The struggle for power in international relations is 
among a series of competing coalitions. The ideology of power in international politics is 
often in tension with the demands of reason, morality, and justice; the morality, mores, and 
law intervene to protect society against a superior power from dominating through brute 
force.11 Morgenthau does not list disease as a factor in any of the theories discussed—his 
definition of power is in economic and military terms.  
Inis Claude expands on Morgenthau’s in his in Power and International Relations 
(1962), Inis Claude Jr. denotes power mainly in terms of military capability and the 
capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy.12 He writes extensively about the balance of power 
and divides his analysis into states of equilibrium or disequilibrium.13 The shift in power 
due to an unbalanced system will affect how a state’s ability to maintain its military and 
economy in the international system.14  
Paul Kennedy further addressed the question of power in The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (1987).15 He 
asserts nations never remain constant “because of the uneven rate of growth among 
different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring 
a greater advantage to one society than to another.”16 Kennedy omits disease as a causal 
factor to power shifts and attributes the changes to states that overextend themselves 
 
10 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 40. 
11 Morgenthau,  225–26. 
12 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 6. See 
also A. F. Pollard, The Balance of Power, for further critiques of Balance of Power theory and if it is even 
possible to have a “balance.” 
13 Claude, 16. 
14  In contrast to internally focused and developed forms of power, collective security calls for an 
alliance system in which nations unite in protecting the stability of the international order. See: Claude, 
Power and International Relations, 144–45. 
15 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Although a historian, his research was similar to 
the social scientists in this section. 
16 Kennedy, XV–XVI. See also William H. McNeil, A World History. McNeil emphasizes that in any 
given age the world balance was liable to disturbances emanating from one or more great powers affecting 
the balance of power.  
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militarily and economically. A state’s replacement as a leader in the international system 
occurs when another country converts its resource bases into a military power that outstrips 
the leader.17  
In Kenneth Waltz’s book, Theory of International Politics (1979), he argues that 
one must study the state in the international system to understand the state. Waltz examines 
how an anarchic system affects a state through the distribution of capabilities.18 How a 
state aligns its capabilities affects its position in the international system by economic and 
military effects. Waltz uses the balance of power theory to express how the imbalances of 
capabilities are dangerous for weaker states due to the larger states’ temptations to engage 
in adventurous activities.19 Waltz’s research demonstrates that a state’s power is essential 
to its position in the international system and follows suit and many other social scientists 
by excluding disease as a factor affecting power.  
In line with Kennedy and Waltz, John Mearsheimer stated the basis of power ties 
to particular material capabilities in his book The Tragedy of International Politics 
(2014).20 The balance of power for a state is a function of tangible assets that a great power 
controls, including its economic and military capabilities. Mearsheimer, in response to 
Waltz, proposed a theory of offensive realism: a state is concerned with how to survive in 
the international system where there is no one to protect them, and the state quickly realizes 
that power is the key to survival.21 Power in the international system is gained or lost at 
the expense of other states, and a state’s ultimate goal is to become a hegemon in the 
system.22 A Great Power can become a regional hegemon when no other state in the region 
 
17 Kennedy, XVI. Kennedy’s research covers the period beginning in 1500, what he determines to be 
the divide between modern and premodern times. Even though the epidemic starts before Kennedy’s 
timeline, the pandemic’s effects influenced the affected nations’ power beyond his theory. 
18 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102. 
19 Waltz, 132. 
20 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55. 
21 Mearsheimer, 20–21. 
22 Mearsheimer, 21. See also George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, for the 
offense-defense balance in international relations.  
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can sufficiently challenge their military capabilities, but the transition to a global hegemon 
is virtually impossible because balances have always formed to thwart aspirants.23  
Recently, Graham Allison’s book, Destined for War: Can America and China 
Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (2017) found 16 cases in which a major nation’s rise disrupted 
the position of a dominant state and suggested the likelihood of war.24 Allison focused on 
the term geo-economics in financial and commercial strength measurements to discuss 
power transmission without ever mentioning disease as a variable.25 Allison did not 
explore the possibility that after a global pandemic the economic power ceded might be 
enough to alter the international system’s standings.  
As the review above suggests, scholars have been excluded plagues from 
international relations and the Balance of Power Theory. Diseases lie in the sometimes 
unforeseen and uncontrollable acts of nature that affect the human race, explaining its 
exclusion. In terms of economic and military force, the constant variables seem to be more 
measurable or controllable—nevertheless disease remains.  
B. POWER, POLITICS, AND DISEASE: THE PLAGUE GAP 
Historians have generally been more attentive to the subject of disease and power. 
For example, William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (1976) covers the impact of 
diseases on human history. His analysis begins with the early man as a hunter/gatherer, 
then transitions to human migration and population clusters. Humans’ ability to alter the 
natural balance is extraordinary and has set biological evolution into overdrive.26 Humans’ 
interaction with nature has clearly emphasized the importance of diseases, to include its 
impact on the rise of societies and political disagreements.  
 
23  Mearsheimer, 40–41. 
24 Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), vii. 
25  Allison, 20–21. 
26 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 15–16. See also Marcia C. Inhorn and Peter Brown, “The 
Anthropology of Infectious Disease.” 
 
11 
Geoffrey Parker expanded on these themes in his book Global Crisis. He examines 
how climate change, mainly in the Europe and Asia, combined with political, economic, 
military, and social developments, affected a nation’s power, ultimately leading to war in 
some cases during the mid-seventeenth century.27 Introducing climate change as a causal 
variable is similar to the introduction of disease into the calculation. Famines and illnesses 
resulting from natural disasters come closest to a variable like plagues. A nation’s ability 
to overcome the widespread catastrophe suggests how pandemics fit into power politics. 
The interdependence of nations and the natural disaster examples Parker gives about 
widespread destruction of resources highlights how—as in a pandemic—states collapse.28 
In one of Parker’s chapters titled “Hunger is the Greatest Enemy,” he examined the supply 
chain’s failure during the seventeenth century in Beijing, Istanbul, Madrid, and other 
influential cities. The disorder of the supply system led to the governments listed above 
being unable to feed all of their populations, and some accounts estimate the population of 
the globe was reduced by one-third.29 China, a powerful country during this period, 
suffered greatly, and it took centuries to recover, both politically and militarily.30 Much 
like famine, pandemics can alter power for centuries to come, especially if introduced into 
an inferior population. 
Jared Diamond’s book Guns, Germs, and Steel explored the impact of power 
transitions by disease directly. Diamond asks why the Native Americans, Africans, and 
Aboriginal Australians were not the ones who “decimated, subjugated, or exterminated” 
the Europeans and Asians?31 Diamond’s explanation is the colonial expansion underway 
during 1500 CE and the vast difference in technology and political organization. 
Additionally, Diamond links the introduction of germs from domestic animals, combined 
with the significant advantage in weaponry, technology, and political organization, as the 
 
27 Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), xxv–xxxii. 
28  Parker, 1–24. 
29 Parker, 55–76. 
30  Parker, 115–17. 
31 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel,15. 
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reason for the inequality.32 The introduction of disease explained how so few European 
immigrants conquered so much of the Americas, despite being vastly outnumbered by the 
local populace. Eurasian advantages over other populations lasted for centuries. However, 
in today’s interdependent international system, the benefits have been leveled mainly by 
the distribution of technology and alliances. One nation does not hold a monopoly over 
crucial weaponry or technology; instead, several great powers hold similar developments 
setting most of the world on an even playing field. Furthermore, nations align with other 
nations in which they share common interests reducing political organization’s advantage. 
The germ is a different variable. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of disease into power political calculations accounts for an essential 
variable in determining why some nations gain power and others lose power. The “plague 
gap” in power politics exposes, especially in today’s interdependent, COVID-ridden world, 
how important it is for a nation to handle a pandemic and develops a historical pathway of 
disease in GPC. Filling the “plague gap” should bring attention to examples throughout 
history when plagues have profoundly altered power relations. This thesis’ ensuing chapter 
will emphasize just how significant disease can be in international relations and the 









32  Diamond, 205. 
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III. OLD WORLD IMPERIALISM 
Power politics is not a new concept; ancient civilizations laid many foundations for 
current international relations theory. In the Mediterranean, ancient states increased power 
by conquering weaker opponents to increase resources. Hand in hand with territorial 
expansion, trade flourished across the empires’ newly seized areas and brought in novel 
goods that interconnected the classical world.33 The increased movement and introduction 
of different goods increased wealth, while it also exposed populations to disease.34 Such 
exposures often had volatile results.  
This chapter will examine three societies’ rise in the Mediterranean and one Asian 
society, followed by their subsequent decline due to several factors, including disease. The 
first case is the Plague of Athens, which occurred during the Peloponnesian War (431—
404 BCE). This conflict primarily pitted Athens against Sparta for primacy in the Aegean 
world. The epidemic experienced by Athens and the conflict resulted in a power decline 
that forced serious strategic adjustment, ultimately leading to Athens’ surrender to Sparta. 
The next case is the Antonine Plague: an infectious outbreak in the Roman Empire under 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161—180 CE). The outbreak weakened the empire’s ability to 
maintain its control of the Mediterranean and forced Marcus Aurelius to scale back his plan 
to move the imperial frontier up to the Carpathians. The third study is the Byzantine 
Empire—formerly known as the Eastern Roman Empire—and the Black Plague’s first 
appearance under Emperor Justinian I (527—565 CE) and the severe strategic 
consequences. The fourth case in this chapter is the Mongol Empire and the outbreak of 
the bubonic plague (1348). Later, to be known as the Black Death, the plague fatally 
weakened the Mongol Empire and restructured Europe. Filling the plague gap in the 
balance of power theory, this chapter charts the impact of disease on regional supremacies 
and the subsequent restructuring of the ancient and premodern worlds power relations. The 
chapter explains how imperial expansion fueled by economic networks encouraged the 
 
33 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 113–15. 
34 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 81–108. 
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unknowing spread of disease. The results devastated the populations, which diminished the 
necessary manpower for the empires’ militaries and destabilized their social stability.  
A. ANCIENT ATHENS: THE PLAGUE OF 430—427 BCE 
The Peloponnesian War occurred between the Athenian-led Delian League versus 
the Spartan-led Corinthian League from 431—404 BCE.35 Before the war, several decades 
of peace existed in the region between the Greek states. By both the democratically aligned 
Athens and authoritarian Spartan, expansion defined a fractious, bipolar Greek world, with 
war as the likely outcome.36 The ensuing conflict would prove to be the ultimate 
confrontation between the two Greek city-states and their allies.37 Thucydides, an 
Athenian historian (and a general), recounted the war in his writings, including an unknown 
disease that infected and killed thousands of Athenians and inflicted a setback from which 
their society never fully recovered.38 
Before the Persian invasions of Greece in 490 and 480 BCE, Sparta was the 
dominant power in the region for more than a century, relying on its powerful land army.39 
The Persians’ attack united the Greeks, and after expelling the Persians from Greece, 
Athens experienced remarkable economic, military and cultural resurgence referred to as 
the “Golden Age” for Athens.40 In 431 BCE, Sparta believed Athens posed a grave security 
threat and attacked Athens’ ally Plataea, one cause of the Peloponnesian War that pitted 
the two great adversaries against each other in a conflict that altered the balance of power.41  
 
35 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Random House, Inc., 
1951), vii. 
36 Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2013), 350, https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801467219. See Also Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can 
America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap. Allision defines this as Thucydide’s Trap—the severe 
structural stress caused when a rising power (Athens) threatens to upend a ruling one (Sparta), pp. 29. 
37 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, xix. 
38 McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 121. See Also A.J. Holladay and J.C.F Poole, “Thucydides and the 
Plague of Athens” and Edward Lytton and Oswyn Murray, Athens: Its Rise and Fall. 
39 Allison, Destined for War, 30–31. 
40 Victor Davis Hanson, A War like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the 
Peloponnesian War, Random House trade paperback ed. (New York: Random House, 2006), 5. 
41 Donald Kagan, New History of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2013), 77, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3138453. 
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In the summer of 430 BCE, Sparta besieged Athens.42 Pericles—Athens’ leader 
and chief strategist—relocated all noncombatants behind fortified city walls before the 
Spartans’ arrival, cramming thousands of citizens inside Athens for months. During this 
phase of the war, an unfamiliar disease began to spread through the city’s crowded refugee 
encampments. The citizens were baffled by the sicknesses because the year had been 
relatively healthy.43 Thucydides wrote: 
People in good health were all of the sudden attacked by violent heats in the 
head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as 
the throat or tongue, becoming bloody, and emitting an unnatural and fetid 
breath…Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its 
appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and 
ulcers.44  
Based on Thucydides’ description of symptoms, the most likely disease was 
smallpox, but numerous other contagions are possible, and this diagnosis still has yet to be 
scientifically confirmed.45 Thucydides wrote that the disease began in Ethiopia and spread 
north to Egypt and Libya and was then carried into Athens by way of the Athenian navy.46 
Initially, the Athenians believed the Spartans had poisoned the drinking wells in 
Piraeus, Athens’s port, to prepare an assault on the city.47 As the disease spread beyond 
the wells and the deaths became more frequent and destructive, it was clear it was contagion 
and not poison. The other Greek city-states had never experienced anything quite like the 
sickness devasting Athens.48 Between 25–35 percent of the Athenian population died due 
 
42 Hanson, A War like No Other, 65–66. 
43 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War, ed. 
Robert B. Strassler (The Free Press, 1996), 118–19. 
44 Thucydides, 119. 
45 J. N. Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2005). 
46 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, 118. 
47 Hanson, A War Like No Other, 70–71. 
48  Hanson,65. The Spartans were not in as close of quarters as the Athenians behind the city walls.  
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to the epidemic, affecting all districts and age groups.49 The classicist Victor Davis Hanson 
estimated the death toll of the plague at over 100,000.50 The close quarters likely increased 
the infection’s spread once it arrived in Athens and aided in the spreading outside of the 
city’s walls to the countryside and military reinforcements.  
The epidemic lasted four years, causing incredible losses in the early stages of the 
war. This greatly hindered Athens’ ability to reinforce its armies.51 Pericles’ death—
caused by the epidemic—led the Athenians to switch to a very conservative military 
approach (avoiding land battles and hoping to wear down the Spartans with sea power), 
shifting the balance of power in favor of the more aggressive Spartans.52 Furthermore, 
Sparta and its allies were affected very little by the disease, enabling continued campaigns 
into the region and further swinging the power pendulum in Sparta’s favor.53  
Athens felt the plague’s social and military repercussions for the remainder of the 
war. When faced with risking death by either disease or Spartan hoplites, lawlessness and 
brutality ensued, changing Athenian culture.54 Thucydides captures the citizens’ behavior 
in his writings,  
Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin 
to the plague. Men now did just what they pleased, cooly [sic] venturing on 
what they had formerly done only in a corner, seeing the rapid transitions 
produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had 
nothing succeeding to their property…Such was the nature of the calamity, 
and heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; death raging within the city and 
devastation without.55  
 
49 Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics, 1–7.  
50 Hanson, A War like No Other, 80.  
51 Hays, Epdimics and Pandemics ,5. 
52 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, 111–21. 
53 Thucydides, 111–21. 
54 Hanson, A War like No Other, 78. 
55 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, 121. 
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The citizens ignored the laws and their gods because of the disease’s morbidity, which 
started to unravel previous societal norms.56  
The death toll battered Athenian human resources. The slaves of Athens had a 
pivotal role in sustaining the economy and supporting military operations.57 Athens used 
slaves for agricultural production, mining of building materials and precious metals, and 
domestic servants. The sudden death of the citizens and slaves contributed significantly to 
the downward spiral of the economy and further hindered the military’s logistical and 
medical support. Athens waged war with caregivers providing for the sick and injured, 
baggage carriers to accompany Athenian phalanx movements, and slaves to power the 
Athenian naval vessels’ oars.58  
These losses to disease during the early stages of the war greatly impacted its course 
negatively for Athens. The Athenian army had roughly 15,000–20,000 military-aged males 
able to fill the hoplite ranks at the war’s onset.59 Within four years, the disease killed 34 
percent of the best troops available for battle. Combat losses and the deaths of hundreds of 
women of child-bearing age women hindered Athens from increasing troop levels for 
future land campaigns. Mysteriously, the disease entirely disappeared by 427 BCE, but its 
effects held heavy over the Athenian society for the next quarter-century of war before 
surrendering to Sparta in 403 BCE.60    
Throughout the war, the resilience of the Athenian Empire suggests the disease was 
not determinative to defeat but that it significantly altered the trajectory in Sparta’s favor. 
Athens’ inability to repopulate its army during the early phases of the war and the Spartan 
forces remaining mostly unaffected greatly influenced its course. The plague inflicted 
losses on the population that dramatically hindered Athenian strategy. Some scholars argue 
that only repeated epidemics may depress population levels for an extended period, but the 
 
56 Hanson, A War Like No Other, 77. 
57 Hanson, 80–81. 
58 Hanson, 81. 
59 Hanson, 79–81. 
60 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, 549–52. J.N. Hays objects that the disease had the impact 
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pandemic’s early arrival influenced the war. In terms of cultural and soft power, the panic 
and fear of the disease further changed the Athenian culture leading to the decline of the 
“Golden Age,” aiding in Athens’ eventual fall to Sparta. Subsequent Mediterranean 
empires were not immune to disease dynamics and suffered similar yet significant setbacks 
as a result.  
B. THE ROMAN EMPIRE: THE ANTONINE PLAGUE (165—180 CE) 
At its peak, the Roman Empire spanned across three continents and accounted for 
a quarter of the world’s population.61 The empire’s stability allowed for urbanization at 
rates unseen in the ancient world, and cities grew beyond their established borders into 
uncultivated land.62 The empire relied heavily on imports to feed Rome’s increasing 
population and other urban settlements.63 The logistics of supplying such a large 
population challenged the supply chain, forcing the expansion of commerce into previously 
unexplored regions in Northern Africa and the Middle East. The Romans constructed 
thousands of miles of new roads, secured sea lanes. Societies, philosophies, commodities, 
and microbes moved along the new lines of communication.64 Through this expansion, the 
possibility of contagion grew. The Roman advance into new surroundings combined with 
the trade zones’ connectivity brought unseen diseases to the empire. The Romans 
experienced several smaller outbreaks of illness brought on by mosquitoes and exotic 
animals imported for entertainment.65 These paled in comparison to the Antonine Plague 
that attacked the empire.  
 
61  Kyle Harper, The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017), 7–9. See Also Brian Campbell, The Romans and Their World: A Short 
Introduction. 
62 Brian Campbell, The Romans and Their World: A Short Introduction (New Haven, CN: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 53, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3420759. 
63 Harper, The Fate of Rome, 11. See Also J.A. Goldstone, “Efflorescences and Economic Growth in 
World History: Rethinking the Rise of the West and the Industrial Revolution,” pp. 323–89. 
64 Harper, 17. See Also Brian Campbell, The Romans and Their World: A Short Introduction. 
65 Harper, 17. See Also William H. McNeil, Plagues and People, pp. 130–31. 
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In winter 165 CE, Roman troops were near present-day Baghdad, fighting the 
Parthians along the empire’s eastern periphery.66 Upon returning to northern Italy—the 
Parthians were never truly subdued—Roman legionaries began to mysteriously fall ill and 
die within a few days of illness. Co-emperor, Lucius Verus, died during his return to Rome 
after leading the Parthian campaign.67 The disease quickly spread through the communities 
that the Roman army had passed through, and it soon began to creep towards Rome.68 
Much of the Roman population lived in urban settlements and often resided in overcrowded 
dwellings, living in unsanitary conditions.69 This environment promoted the spread of 
disease similar to the conditions faced by citizens of Athens.  
At the onset of the disease in Rome, the Roman physician Claudius Galenus, or 
Galen, was summoned to investigate—and like Thucydides—he documented the plague, 
although for medical purposes instead of historical.70 Galen describes the disease; “on the 
outside the body was not hot to the touch, nor was there [sic] pallor; the skin was rather 
red, livid, and broke out into small blister and ulcers.”71 This description and other 
symptoms are similar to the disease described by Thucydides, pointing towards smallpox 
as the culprit. Galen was also concerned about the long-lasting effects the plague would 
have on the population.72 Galen was not alone in his concerns for the empire as it affected 
the thoughts of theirs as well.  
Emperor Marcus Aurelius reflected on the plague and its effects on Roman society 
in his book, Meditations. He said, “For a far greater plague is the corruption of the mind, 
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than any certain change and distemper of the common air can be.”73 Like the citizens’ 
response in ancient Athens, Roman citizens experienced death caused by disease on a scale 
yet unseen in the empire. Upwards of 2,000 a day died in Rome, which demoralized the 
city, causing panic and fear.74 The disease did not discriminate. Marcus Aurelius writes:  
Those words which once were common and ordinary, are now become 
obscure and obsolete; and so the names of men once commonly known and 
famous, are now become in a manner and obsolete names. Camillus, Cieso, 
Volesius, Leonnatus; not long after, Scipio, Cato, then Augustus, then 
Adrianus, then Antonius Pius: all these in a short time will be out of date, 
and, as things of another world as it were, become fabulous. And this I say 
of them, who once shined as the wonders of their ages, for as for the rest, 
no sooner are they expired, than with them all their fame and memory.75  
The loss of so many prominent figures, including his confidant Lucius Verus, 
signified a turning point.76 The usual outlets of festivals or gladiator fights stopped, 
causing anxiety and discontent in Rome and other cities.77 Alongside the societal woes, 
the empire’s agricultural and trade economies suffered greatly.  
Citizens across the empire felt the economic impact. The Romans were unable to 
feed themselves because of agricultural output decline caused by either death of workers 
or people fleeing to escape the pestilence.78 The fatalities and evacuations of citizens 
greatly affected tax collections leaving the Roman treasury in evermore dire straits.79 The 
monetary system crisis, stemming from the halt to silver coin production in Egypt, caused 
high inflation, making what little goods that were still available unaffordable.80 
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Additionally, the decline of public building projects and the decrease in marble and brick 
production further cemented the disease’s disastrous effects on the Roman economy,81  
The decline of the empire’s economy combined with the fifteen-year epidemic’s 
high mortality rate, with an estimated five-ten million deaths, was particularly devasting 
for the Roman army.82 The crippled Roman legions were less able to defend the borders 
around the empire adequately. The constant deaths within the military must have made 
campaign planning extremely challenging, aiding Rome’s enemies. The disease circulated 
throughout the empire and occasionally revisited previously affected cities ending the 
revitalization that just began.83 
The Roman Empire was under siege by disease, trapped in an economic recession, 
and facing increasingly hostile enemies at its borders, exploiting the new weakness. 
Despite all this, the final tipping point may be Emperor Marcus Aurelius’ death—likely to 
the plague that bears his name, in 180 CE.84 Like Pericles, the death of the majestic leader 
sent shockwaves throughout the empire. His final words, “Why do you weep for me? Why 
do you not rather consider the pestilence and the common death?” showcased his 
patriarchal affection for the empire.85 Commodus, his son, became the new emperor and 
was assassinated in 192 CE due to his atrocities and eccentricities, ending the rule of the 
Antonines.86 The empire never fully recovered from its economic, military, and leadership 
debility due to the epidemic.  
As with Athens, the Roman Empire’s conquest brought vast wealth and prosperity 
to the empire, but with growth, the likelihood of disease spreading increased. The 
continued expansion and logistical system to support the empire connected the Romans to 
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unfamiliar lands. The rapidity with which the disease spread and the mortality rate shocked 
the Roman culture by its indiscriminate spread, affecting everyday citizens and public 
figures. The resulting loss of life set the economy in turmoil, further weakening the empire. 
The empire’s inability to reinforce its military additionally hindered the protection of its 
boundaries. It forced Aurelius to abandon his plan to extend the empire’s northern border 
in central Europe to the Carpathian Mountains—which would have increased security 
against northern barbarian tribes immeasurably for centuries to come. The Antonine Plague 
not only exacerbated the decline but created ongoing issues felt well into the empire’s 
future. Rome’s survivor in the East, the Byzantine Empire, faced similar challenges.  
C. THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE: THE PLAGUE OF JUSTINIAN (541—547 
CE) 
After Marcus Aurelius died in 180 CE, the reign of what was known as the Five 
Good Emperors ended, marking the beginning of a long decline of power for the Roman 
Empire in the West.87 The Western Roman Empire fell after a series of invasions in 476 
CE, but its Eastern counterpart lived on in the form of the Byzantine Empire for another 
millennium. The capital Constantinople provided a strategic position straddling the 
European/Asian continents, provided better harbors for shipping, and closer proximity to 
Asian trading powers than the Italian Peninsula.88 Under Emperor Justinian’s rule 
beginning in 527, the Byzantine Empire recovered numerous western provinces, sustained 
a short peace with the Persians and increased expansion eastward.89 Constantinople 
became a global hub for trade, and its connections with India and China put not only people 
and goods on the move but also new diseases.  
Trade within the empire and its partners flourished, aided by the movement of 
goods on ships.90 The Romans used ships to move and, in combination with land silos, 
store vast grain quantities to feed and sustain the empire. The enormous amounts of grain 
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attracted large numbers of rats.91 Rat stowaways were a common sight on transport ships. 
New micro parasitism carried by fleas on black rats originating on ships sailing from India 
introduced a novel disease in the Eastern Empire.92 The first outbreak began in Egypt near 
Pelusium in 541 and then Alexandria, causing a heavy death toll.93 From Egypt, the plague 
moved north up the coasts of Palestine and Syria, always originating in the ports and then 
moving inland.94 
The bubonic plague’s first occurrence arrived in Constantinople in March 542, 
lasting only four months because the rat and human populations crashed so quickly that the 
epidemic could no longer support itself.95 At first, the death toll rose slightly above the 
average death rate in Constantinople, but soon it increased rapidly until the death toll soared 
to around ten thousand daily.96 Byzantine scholar Procopius of Caesarea, much like his 
predecessors Thucydides and Galen documented the plague: 
The first symptoms were fever and lassitude, neither of which seemed life-
threatening. But soon, if not on the same day, then shortly thereafter, buboes 
appeared in the groin or armpits, or sometimes beside the ears or on the 
thighs. Then the disease progressed rapidly. The victim might fall into a 
lethargic state or else become delirious, and eating was difficult. Some 
suffered from none of these symptoms but died painfully when their buboes 
gangrened…A number of victims broke out with black blisters like lentils 
over their bodies, and these died swiftly…Pregnant women who contracted 
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the disease generally died through miscarriage or in childbirth, though 
young males suffered the heaviest toll.97  
Greek poet and principal historian to Emperor Justinian I Agathias Scholasticus 
further reported, “death was swift: in two or three days—five at the most…Animals—dogs, 
mice and even snakes—were affected.”98  
The estimated death rate in 542 CE was between 50–60 percent in Constantinople, 
equating to 250,000–300,000 casualties in a city over a half million people in just four 
months.99 Even Emperor Justinian was not immune; he survived after contracting the 
plague in the initial onset. Procopius said, “Confusion began to reign everywhere and in all 
ways,” as the dead bodies quickly began to overrun government services in Constantinople, 
causing the social order to unravel soon.100 Those who could afford to leave fled the city, 
and a saying attributed to Galen encouraging the departures decreed, “I urge you to go far 
away and don’t come back soon.”101 The city disregarded burial rituals and neglected 
necessary environmental control. Justinian appointed his clerk Theodoros to organize an 
emergency response, and historian John of Ephesus commented about the sights in the city, 
and the pits dug for dead bodies outside the walls: “The dead were cross-hatched in layer, 
like hay in a stack. The victims were trodden upon by feet and trampled like spoiled 
grapes…The corpse which was trampled sank and was immersed in the pus of those below 
it…like watching the wine-press of the fury of the wrath of God, that was a sign of the end 
times.” 102 
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The Plague quickly spread outside the capital, and citizens from the countryside 
commented about the pestilence spread to “the whole country…every place in the 
country.”103 Its speed and severity left the affected regions defenseless and annihilated 
entire populations.104 Crops rotted in unharvested fields, and grapes rotted on the vines 
because no one was there to harvest them, causing famine to coincide with the plague.105 
Constantinople’s economy was in shambles; the price of gold bottomed out, building 
projects suddenly stopped, trade ceased throughout the empire as towns disappeared, and 
taxation increased to all-time highs on the surviving citizens to recover the lost income.106  
Like Rome and Greece, the sudden loss of young, military-age men strained 
Byzantine Army recruitment and, combined with combat losses, hindered the army’s 
campaign capabilities. During the first wave of the pandemic, military campaigns were 
toned down remarkably.107  During the post-plague years, the empire struggled with army 
recruitment shortages. The numerous waves of the plague within the empire further 
burdened Emperor Justinian’s objectives and hindered his ability to mobilize an army, 
much less pay for one.108  
Over the next two centuries, 541-—750 CE, the plague revisited Constantinople 
another six times, and overall there were about eighteen outbreaks in the Byzantine 
Empire.109 Each episode of the plague struck fast and inflicted similar outcomes as in its 
first appearance in 541 CE. The Eastern Empire’s population in 500 CE was estimated to 
be just below 30 million people, 100 years later—58 years after the onset of the Plague of 
Justinian—the population was estimated to be slightly above 10 million people.110 The 
plague’s multiple waves had devasting effects on the Byzantine Empire and the lands 
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surrounding the Mediterranean. The epidemic made its way east to Persia and north and 
west as far the British Isles.111 The disease never settled anywhere for long but remained 
lethal in its sporadic occurrences. In the two centuries of the Plague of Justinian, there was 
not a single decade the plague was not active in the Mediterranean region, and much like 
its sudden appearance, it mysteriously vanished.112   
The despair caused by the Plague of Justinian took a tremendous toll on the 
Byzantine Empire’s stability and the regions surrounding the empire. The Byzantines 
struggled economically and militarily because of the millions of citizens killed throughout 
the two centuries in which the plague continually recurred. The death faced by the 
Byzantines was on a previously unseen scale, and the society struggled with everyday 
existence. Each plague occurrence had similar effects across the empire, setting back the 
strides made in between the outbreaks. Military power was necessary for the Byzantine 
Empire to protect and expand its borders. Still, the inability to reinforce the army after the 
numerous waves of the plague weakened the military’s future capabilities, signifying the 
halt to its outward expansion until its eventual fall centuries later. 
D. THE MONGOL EMPIRE AND THE BLACK DEATH (1348) 
The Mongol Empire, founded by Genghis Khan in 1206 and lasting beyond his 
death in 1227, subjugated more lands and people in twenty-five years than the Romans had 
in four hundred.113 While often maligned, the Mongol Empire was a sophisticated 
experiment in the early modern state and empire building. Genghis Khan discarded the 
feudal system of aristocratic privilege and birth; he created a new approach based on 
individual merit, loyalty, and achievement and connected Europe with Asia by organizing 
trading towns along the Silk Road to create history’s largest free trade zones.114 At the 
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peak of the Mongol Empire (1279-1350), it ruled over all of China, nearly all of Russia, 
and Central Asia, including modern Iraq and Iran.115  
Genghis Khan’s empire connected and incorporated the conquered civilizations 
into a new world order, and previously regional civilizations had no knowledge of their 
neighbors beyond the horizon.116 The movement of people and goods across the Eurasian 
continent connected the civilizations culturally and epidemiologically. The Mongols 
established a communication system capable of rapidly distributing information 
throughout the empire.117 Soon, troop movements, caravans of goods, and postal riders 
frequented the Silk Road, exposing more significant numbers to ailments. The plague 
introduced by the Mongols ended their empire and restructured Europe.  
After Genghis Khan died, the Mongol Empire’s dynasty was threatened from 
within by internal power struggles within his family, and externally by something more 
sinister and mysterious than the internal tussles—the plague.118 In 1332, the plague struck 
Hubei province in China, and lasted for a century, reducing the population between one-
half and two-thirds.119 The Mongols’ depended on China as its manufacturing center, and 
in an echo of earlier cases, the Silk Road that moved goods throughout Eurasia also served 
as a roadway for the disease.120  
The trade networks established by the Mongols allowed for the free flow of goods 
and fleas through trading posts.121 The flea spread the plague westward over the next 
decade from small camps to villages, cities, and continents. As with the previous chapter’s 
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epidemics, the bubonic plague affected urban areas more readily, completely depopulating 
the cities and altering the social order.122 The historian Henry H. Howorth writes: 
The victims were suddenly struck…as with a knife, at the breast, at the 
shoulder-blade, or between the shoulders; a devouring fire consumed the 
entrails, blood flowed at the mouth, a burning fever was succeeded by a 
shivering cold, tumors [sic] appeared on the neck, the hips, under the arms, 
or behind the shoulder-blade. The issue was always the same—inevitable 
death, swift but terrible. Out of each hundred persons but ten remained 
well.123   
The plague was deadly to the Mongols, but it posed less danger of becoming an 
epidemic in the sparsely populated plains. The concentration of Mongols for battle created 
the environment the plague needed to inflict mass casualties on the army, creating a 
manpower crisis similar to the ones that hit the Greeks and Romans.  
The plague struck the Mongol army in 1345 while it besieged Genoese merchants 
in Caffa on the north coast of the Black Sea in its territory’s western expanses.124 The 
plague-stricken Mongol army retreated, but according to a lawyer named Gabriele de 
Mussis, the soldiers “ordered that their cadavers be placed on catapults and lobbed into the 
city of Caffa in order that the intolerable stench of those bodies might extinguish everyone 
[inside].”125 This tactic does not align with the Mongol practice and demonstrates rashness 
because of the plague. From Caffa, the plague spread into Europe in 1346 and became 
known as the Black Death. The American medievalist David Herlihy states: 
We cannot cite exact losses; there are no global figures. The populations of 
some cities and villages, in areas as far removed from each other as England 
and Italy, fell in the late decades of the fourteenth century by 70 or 80 
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percent. The more we learn of the late medieval collapse in human numbers, 
the more awesome it appears.126 
The Mongol rulers in Persia and Russia could not trade with China and Mongolia 
due to the plague.127 The stoppage of the flow of goods from China westward into the 
empire deprived the Mongols of the primary commerce of trade and tribute. The Mongol 
Golden Horde already had fault lines in their political relationships with each other in the 
century after Genghis Khan’s death. Still, with the occurrence of the plague, the complex 
cultural and commercial system collapsed.128 The Mongol Empire relied on the swift and 
continuous movement of people, goods, and information to maintain control, but the 
isolation severed the connections. 
The Mongols thrived on military strength and commercial wealth to govern 
conquered lands in which they were outnumbered by as much as a thousand to one.129 
Unfortunately, the loss of the flow of goods and the dissipation of the army’s strength 
created a volatile situation that could quickly turn hostile and forced the separated Golden 
Family to align with religious factions in the occupied regions to maintain control, further 
fracturing the empire. The local elites in Korea, Russia, and China expelled the Mongols 
and took back control of the Mongols’ government, returning it to the native dynasties.130 
Despite the Mongol Empire’s fall, the successive rulers continued many Mongol 
governmental practices, keeping the façade of the former empire seemingly intact.131 The 
fractured kingdom and the communication system’s breakup left the Europeans 
uninformed of the Mongol Empire’s fall. 
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Genghis Khan built an empire more extensive than the Roman Empire in only a 
quarter of a century. The Mongols relied on military strength to conquer and maintain 
foreign lands and complemented the occupation with a vast trade network enriching the 
conquered lands. The widespread free-trade zones brought fleas carrying the bubonic 
plague from China. The extensive network of roadways along the Silk Road enabled the 
plague’s movement through the Mongol Empire and into Europe to become known as the 
Black Death. Although not sparred by the pandemic, the Mongol sparse arrangements 
allowed them to fare better than the regions to the east and west. The Black Death mostly 
cut off from the world to the Mongols. The Golden Family of Khan descendants integrated 
with the local cultures to maintain power over the Mongol Empire’s various kingdoms. 
The lack of trade commerce and the inability to reinforce the armies around the empire 
strained the Mongols local relationships. The associations restructured the former Mongol 
Empire and changed the dynamics of Eurasia, further transforming the region into modern 
Eurasia.  
E. CONCLUSION  
The cases considered in this chapter highlight the devasting effects of disease on 
Great Powers and their ability to shift the power balance when struck by disease. Each of 
the societies studied shared commonalities leading up to and throughout the novel 
pathogens’ outbreaks. The capitals in the Mediterranean cultures were the cores of these 
empires, while the Mongols relied on trade zones created after conquering a state. The trade 
economies for each empire fueled expansion and enhanced the power held in the 
Mediterranean and Asia. However, both trade and military action, which fostered economic 
growth and imperial security, also exposed these empires to novel diseases for which 
people had little immunity.  
The introduction of disease into densely populated urban areas is another 
commonality shared by these societies. The spread of disease was rapid and deadly in their 
population centers. The sudden onset quickly outran the governments’ abilities to handle 
the sick, and as a result, the corpses began to accumulate within the cities. The death tolls 
led to towns shutting down and citizens fleeing trying to escape the epidemic, but this only 
31 
spread the disease out into the rural lands—with the resulting deaths in the countryside 
negatively affecting agriculture, thus leading to food shortages, furthering the panic and 
desperation. Troop movements further spread disease and weakened the military’s ability 
to maintain control in these empires’ contested regions. The initial death tolls were high, 
and when combined with numerous waves of disease, it created manpower crises. The 
militaries in all three cases struggled to replenish their forces over the ensuing decades. 
The death of citizens in the city, the losses to the military by both disease and conflict, the 
collapse of the economies, and the governments’ inability to cope with these 
epidemics weakened the great powers of the time—and well beyond the conclusion of 
the various outbreaks. This chapter closes the plague gap by underlining the impact 
of disease on ancient regional hegemonies and the ensuing restructuring of power 
relations. Imperialist expansion connected areas but resulted in the spread of disease, 
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IV. NEW WORLD COLONIZATION AND COMPETITION 
BETWEEN GREAT POWERS 
This chapter examines three cases that demonstrate how the Great Powers of 
Europe gained influence and territory in the “New World” via numerous factors, but 
primarily through diseases and their effects on populations. As with the early civilizations 
from the previous chapter, disease had a formidable impact on New World colonialism. In 
all cases, the conquerors introduced—intentionally or not—pathogens to which only they 
had immunities, aiding in forceful territorial development and defense at times. 
The first case details the Aztecs’ interaction with the Spanish Conquistadors from 
1519—1521. The Spaniards’ numerically inferior force introduced pathogens to which the 
Aztecs had no immunities, helping destroy the manpower of the Aztecs and their organized 
resistance. The second case covers the Spanish reinforcement of the Americas by way of 
fortifications by disease. In 1762, the British seized the Spanish stronghold in Havana, but 
an outbreak of yellow fever made the British unable to retain the city. This chapter’s last 
case is the siege of Fort Pitt in 1763 during Pontiac’s Rebellion. An Indian uprising in the 
Ohio River Valley surprised the British, but smallpox was introduced by the British to the 
Indian population with disastrous effects. Filling the plague gap, this chapter charts the 
impact disease has had on societies when used strategically in terms of offensive and 
defensive operations related to GPC.  
A. SPANISH COLONIZATION OF MEXICO: THE FALL OF THE AZTEC 
EMPIRE (1519—1521) 
The late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth century witnessed a series of wars and 
modernizations in Europe—Geoffrey Parker called it the “Military Revolution”—which 
promoted an age of European Military superiority over other areas of the globe.132 
Scholars have used various methods to explain the rise of European maritime imperialism 
in the early modern era, but disease was among the imperialist tools as with earlier 
examples. Arguably most notable, Spanish Conquistador Hernán Cortés arrived in 1519 
 
132 Parker, The Military Revolution. 
 
34 
near Veracruz on Mexico’s central coast and discovered the Aztec Empire and the riches 
for which they were searching.133 The vastly outnumbered Spanish force toppled the Aztec 
Empire, numbering close to 1.6 million people—by 1521, primarily aided by disease 
striking the Aztecs, superior Spanish weapons technology, and alliances with natives.134 
The conquest established Spain’s foothold in the region by way of disease.  
Hernán Cortés arrived in Central Mexico in February 1519 after setting sail from a 
Spanish colony in Cuba following the myths from previous expeditions about a wealthy 
kingdom in the mountains west of Veracruz. A contingent of conquistadors, numbering 
around 500, landed, and Aztec ambassadors met them on the shore. Though summoned 
back to Cuba by Governor Velásquez, Cortés disregarded the directive and, in November 
1519, entered the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan, which had a population of 200,000.135 
While in the capital, Cortés learned of a Spanish force sent to arrest him in the spring of 
1520 for insubordination, but Panfilo Narvaez—leader of the new party—and his forces 
were later convinced to join Cortés, bringing his troops to slightly under 900 men.136 The 
Spanish troops sent to arrest Cortés introduced smallpox into the Yucatan Peninsula 
inhabitants before joining Cortés. Once united with Cortés, smallpox spread into the 
capital, setting forth an outbreak in Central Mexico.137  
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Cortés fled Tenochtitlan from an Aztec military uprising in the summer of 1520 
which led to the death of Moctezuma and his brother Cuitlahuac’s appointment as the Aztec 
leader.138 While Cortés was away, the smallpox epidemic struck the Aztecs, crippling the 
empire. Spanish historian at the time, López de Gómara describes the smallpox outbreak 
as so damaging that it was necessary to pull “the houses down to cover the corpses…they 
subsequently used the date as a marker for the end of an old era and beginning of a new. 
They counted the year from it, as from some famous event.”139 The Spanish invaders were 
immune to (some had had smallpox already, others were less affected than the Aztecs when 
they got it) smallpox, but the Aztecs, not knowing this, believed them to be supernatural 
and sent by angry gods for punishment.140 Panic among the population ensued, and society 
quickly unraveled, as with the Greek and Roman civilizations. 
Tenochtitlan’s population either died or fled from the disease, leaving no one to 
care for the sick and run society’s necessities.141 The city’s districts began to fall ill; the 
new emperor, members of the royal family and the empire’s subjects, and the Aztec troops 
died of smallpox, filling the streets with dead bodies.142 Soon after the smallpox outbreak 
began, the famine which often accompanies mass outbreaks began. The once-flourishing 
markets provided not only goods but a social outlet for the exchange of ideas and 
information.143 The urbanized concentration of people proved to be deadly—just as with 
other diseases. López de Gómara describes the disaster in Central Mexico as: “And then 
came famine, not because of a want of bread, but of meal, for the women do nothing but 
grind maize between two stones and bake it. The women, then, fell sick of smallpox, bread 
failed, and many died of hunger.”144 
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All this came a critical moment for the Spanish. Cortés besieged the city in the 
summer of 1521 with nearly 900 Spaniards plus several thousand allies from the 
neighboring Tlacopan tribe.145 The siege on the stricken city lasted several months. When 
the attacking force finally recaptured the Aztec capital, Friar Bernardino de Sahagún said, 
“the streets were so filled with dead and sick people that our men walked over nothing but 
bodies.”146 As a result of smallpox alone, 900,000 people in the empire died from 1519—
1521.147 Historian William McNeill notes, “Clearly, if smallpox had not broken out when 
it did, Cortez’s [sic] victory would have been more difficult, and perhaps impossible.”148 
However deadly the smallpox outbreak had been, the alliance of native tribes by Cortés 
gave him a significant advantage in troop numbers during the battle for Tenochtitlan.149 
The disease was especially devastating to the Aztec elites since they interacted with the 
Spaniards the most.150 The outcome not only diminished raw manpower but effective 
leadership as well. 
In sum, Cortés’ conquistadors discovered the Aztec Empire the great riches it held 
to fuel the Spanish Empire. Cortés’ forces were vastly outnumbered but were able to 
conquer and colonize the Aztecs. The unbeknown introduction of smallpox to the Aztecs 
by the Spaniards was a key to victory. The Spanish had superior weapons and tactics, but 
the panic and death caused by smallpox proved to be the great divider, limiting the Aztecs’ 
ability to fend off the invaders. The Spanish colonization of Central Mexico added to the 
Spanish Empire and separated Spain from the other European Great Powers.  
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B. DISEASE AND THE DEFENSE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN THE 
AMERICAS: THE SIEGE OF HAVANA (1762) 
Over the next century, five great powers of the Atlantic world—Spain, France, 
Portugal, the Dutch, and England—competed for influence and territory in the 
Americas.151 Spain used the knowledge gained of immunities as a defensive means  
in the New World, a tactic most clearly seen in the defense of Havana during the Seven 
Years’ War. 
Nearly a century and a half after the Aztecs fell to Hernán Cortés, the Spanish 
Empire recognized logistical difficulties, and the tyranny of distance of the New World 
from Europe would not protect the resources from invaders forever.152 Spain constructed 
a network of fortified strongholds in the Americas, creating strategic chokeholds along sea 
routes to control the movement of trade and treasure.153 Along with the fortifications, the 
Spanish recognized the significance of their acquired immunity to yellow fever. The 
Spanish filled their garrisons with recruits from the local area to provide such immunities 
and protect Havana’s prized port—Spainish America’s linchpin.154 During the Seven 
Years’ War and the British siege of Havana, yellow fever turned a British conquest into a 
pyrrhic victory and a stalemate. Unable to hold Havana, Britain returned it to Spain. Thus, 
disease and immunity proved of both offensive and defensive value to Spanish imperialism. 
Or, as Spanish engineer Francisco Ricaud de Tirgale said in 1761 (shortly before he died 
in Cuba), “fortifications and mines could delay attackers, but experience shows it is the 
climate alone that debilitates armies.”155 
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The Spanish reliance on strategic forts and immunities to yellow fever as part of 
their imperial defense was prominent throughout the New World and embodied in 
Veracruz. The lowlands provided an excellent source of stagnating water that mosquitoes 
required, and recruits from upland Mexico or Spain died at exorbitant rates—in the worst 
year, 50 percent.156 A British officer recalled in 1740; visitors risked their lives in summer: 
Vera Cruz [sic] is reckoned unhealthy, especially when the flota is there, or 
any great concourse of people…; and when a great number of people loges 
in the Town together during these heats [sic] they are visited with a 
pestilential distemper called the vomito prieto, of which disease many 
people die.157 
 
The ideal Spanish fortifications in the Caribbean entailed sizeable defenses that 
required the invaders weeks to prepare for the siege in the low-lying, swampy areas outside 
the batteries.158 In combination with their soldiers’ immunity to yellow fever, the 
Spaniards created a ring of fortifications capable of repelling competing Great Powers from 
Europe. 
The Seven Years’ War—known in the U.S. as the French and Indian War—offered 
a concrete test of these defenses. The conflict erupted between 1754 between the Anglo-
Prussian alliance France—with Spain joining France after 1761.159 The fighting was trivial 
to the Spanish, mostly confined away from their area of interest until they entered the war. 
In response, the British government under William Pitt hoped to seize Havana, the key to 
the Indies.  
Within fifty-seven days of Spain’s declaration of war, British planners began to 
prepare for the assault on Havana with an assault force of 12,000 soldiers, slightly more 
than 14,000 sailors and 3,000 hired hands to crew the nearly 200 transport vessels, and a 
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reserve force of almost 4,000 in North America.160 Havana’s population was close to 
50,000 people and fortified heavily with 10,000 to 11,000 defenders.161  The British had a 
small window for an attack because of geographic features, weather patterns, and the 
yellow fever season.  
The British landed near Havana and quickly captured strategic positions around the 
city, aided by the fair-weather conditions and a superior force.162 The British surrounded 
Havana putting colonial governor Juan de Prado in a precarious position. Yellow fever was 
an ally of the Spanish, given their immunity to it, and aided in the British defeat in 
Cartagena years earlier.163 No such luck was forthcoming for Juan de Pedro. The rainy 
season and subsequent rise in yellow fever cases did not occur as anticipated. Facing defeat, 
Prado was obligated to seek terms of surrender to the British army commander, the Earl of 
Albemarle.164 
Incredibly, within days of the Spanish surrender of Havana to the British, the rains 
began to fall, and yellow fever overtook the British.165 Albemarle understood the 
significance of yellow fever, writing: “So reduced by sickness, and the well so unfit for 
almost any service, that, if the governor had been firm, he might have named his own terms. 
Had Prado held out another week or two he might have held out forever…or had the North 
Americans not come when they did, the siege would have failed.”166   
The rainy season unleashed yellow fever’s full wrath on the remaining British 
invaders. By mid-October, Albemarle had lost more men to yellow fever than the British 
 
160 David Marley, Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to 
the Present (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 290–92. See Also David Syrett, The Siege and 
Capture of Havana, 1762. 
161 McNeill, Mosquito Empires, 171–74. 
162  McNeill, 178–83. 
163  McNeill,178. 
164  McNeill,182. 
165 McNeill, 182–83. 
166  McNeill,183. See Also Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, pp. 500–02. 
 
40 
had lost in the entire Seven Years’ War in all of North America.167 Over 4,700 soldiers 
had died of disease, and of the 11,000 plus sent for the siege, only 2,067 were fit for duty, 
weakening the British the hold on western Cuba. The navy did not fare any better, losing 
upwards of 3,000 sailors to disease, and when combined with the army’s deaths, the 
occupation of Havana killed about 10,000 British troops.168 Benjamin Franklin wrote, “It 
has been however the dearest conquest by far that we have purchas’d this war when we 
consider the terrible Havock [sic] made by the sickness in that brave Army of Veterans, 
now almost totally ruined.”169 
As peace negotiations opened, Yellow fever was still rampant in Havana, killing 
the British daily. The Peace of Paris, signed in February 1763, called for the British to turn 
Havana back to the Spanish despite the great sacrifices taken to conquer the city.170  
Additionally, British elites expressed no desire for further Caribbean conquest, even if 
successful, due to the terrible experience at Havana.171 The manpower shortage from 
yellow fever had cascading effects for the British and their American colonial policies and 
the ability to respond to armed insurrection. Spain did not escape unphased either. The 
shock of losing Havana, the loss of naval vessels, and trade disputes severely weakened its 
Bourbon alliance with France and its ability to project power in the region.172 
The Spanish understood all this and advanced their hold on the Caribbean by way 
of disease. Spain preferred to recruit soldiers locally because of their immunities to yellow 
fever. Still, if locals were not available, Spain sent sizeable numbers of troops with the 
expectation that many would die, but some would gain immunity. The Spanish used 
fortifications to delay sieges on strategic positions, which exposed the invaders to yellow 
fever. Despite the British siege’s success at Havana, the staggering deaths by yellow fever 
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and the end of war forced the British to return Havana to Spain. It also brought an end to 
the British objectives of seizing other territories from Spain in the Americas. The Spanish 
temporarily lost Havana, but the peace treaty returned its prized port safeguarding its hold 
over the area. In the case of the Spanish colonization efforts, disease proved to be a tool of 
imperialist expansion and a defensive mainstay. 
C. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: PONTIAC’S REBELLION—SIEGE OF FORT 
PITT (1763) 
In the spring of 1763, warriors from numerous American Indian tribes began 
besieging outlying British outposts after the policies of General Jeffery Amherst—British 
North American commander—imperiled the cultural and economic way of life of the 
Native Americans.173 The stunning success by the Indians in the early stages of Pontiac’s 
Rebellion saw several British forts sacked, leaving only Fort Pitt and Detroit in the Ohio 
Valley and Great Lakes region. An outbreak of smallpox occurred in Fort Pitt, and General 
Amherst ordered Fort Pitt to give blankets from the smallpox hospital to the Indians.174 
The British learned the effect of disease from their experiences in Cuba. The outbreak 
crippled the Indian forces enabling the British to reclaim the lost territory. Disease—in this 
case, a calculated weaponized form—was used as a tool for power in the face of an 
ascendant enemy force. 
The Seven Years’ War, concluded by the Treaty of Paris, ceded Great Britain all 
Canada, the Great Lakes, the Ohio territory, and the Acadia maritime provinces from 
France in 1763.175 The Native Americans in the newly acquired lands held long-running 
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alliances with the French. Suddenly, the Native Americans were under British rule.176 The 
expected change in loyalty also came with new territorial policies from the British General 
Amherst—who had to cut expenses because of the drain of the war on the royal treasury.177 
The policy change included banning gifts intended for the Indians they depended on, 
including armaments, food rations, and alcohol. The prohibition offended the Indians in 
the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region in North America. Under Ottawa chieftain Pontiac, 
several tribes banded together to form an army, at times numbering close to 10,000.178  
The Indian confederation attacked British outposts in the region and began to 
campaign eastward toward Fort Pitt, located in what is today western Pennsylvania, in May 
of 1763.179 The following month the Indians had taken all of the significant British 
settlements, except the forts at Detroit and Pitt. Fort Pitt’s population had swelled to a 
population over 500—included soldiers and refugees—fleeing Pontiac’s army, but then 
smallpox broke out among the inhabitants.180 Captain Ecuyer—commander of Fort Pitt—
wrote Bouquet anxiously about the situation: “We are so crowded in the fort that I fear 
disease, for, in spite of every care, I cannot keep the place as clean as I should like. Besides, 
the smallpox is among us.”181 
With Fort Pitt cut off from resupply, General Amherst ordered a contingent from 
New York to reinforce it.182  However, many of these units were still recuperating from 
the effects of disease after returning from Havana. A weakened Fort Pitt and a rescue army 
mostly unable to march forced the British to conceive a counterattack against the invaders.  
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A series of letters between Colonel Bouquet and General Amherst shows the two 
discussed the possibilities of intentionally spreading smallpox to the Indians.183 General 
Amherst corresponded with Colonel Bouquet in July 1763, and they exchanged several 
communications: Amherst writes, “You will do well to try to inoculate the Indians by 
means of blankets, as well as to try every other method that can serve extirpate the 
execrable race.”184  
An invoice certified by Captain Ecuyer on August 13, 1763, shows the British gave 
the Indians sundries of two blankets, one silk handkerchief, and one linen to infect them 
with smallpox.185 The Indians lived in close-knit dwellings, and the British knew the 
disease would spread rapidly, infecting both warriors and their families. Similar to the 
Spanish, the British understood the power disease would have on unexposed populations—
from their lessons learned in Cuba, perhaps.  
During Pontiac’s Rebellion, smallpox epidemics broke out in the region, and a force 
of only 400 Shawnee and Delaware Indians surrounded Fort Pitt.186 Unable to take the fort 
after nearly a month of siege, the Indians moved to intercept the reinforcements led by 
Colonel Bouquet. Near Bushy Run, east of Pittsburgh, the Indians and Colonel Bouquet’s 
forces met.187 The British troops were still weary from the war with France, and the Indians 
were reeling from smallpox. Colonel Bouquet handily defeated the Indians ending the 
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threat near Fort Pitt but incurred heavy losses.188 Neither side was able to undertake 
offensive operations in the area because of disease.  
General Amherst’s austere policies sparked an uprising from the Indians after the 
war and the peace treaty signed with France. Pontiac banded several tribes together and 
launched an assault on the British forts in the Ohio River Valley, surprising the British. 
British soldiers weakened by the yellow fever outbreaks in Havana the year prior slowed 
the response force. British military leaders in the area unleashed smallpox onto the Indians 
by giving them blankets from the smallpox hospital ward at Fort Pitt. The epidemic quickly 
spread through the Indians, weakening the warrior army leading to their eventual defeat in 
the Pittsburgh area by Colonel Bouquet. Both sides felt the effects of disease unleashed by 
a foe. But in the end, the use of biological warfare allowed Britain to consolidate its newly-
won hold on North America. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The cases considered in this chapter highlight the devastating effects of disease 
when introduced to societies without immunities. Each of the great powers relied on 
superior military and technology forces to conquer a substantially larger force—altering 
the New World borders and Old World order of power in the process.  
The introduction of disease into a susceptible population—whether intentional or 
not—is the commonality. The cases of imperial conquest in the New World all benefited 
from the introduction of disease into society. Smallpox overcame the Aztecs and the Native 
Americans, a factor as important as military field operations. The Spanish used immunities 
gained from disease to fortify the Americas from European invaders. The British were able 
to seize a Spanish stronghold. Once yellow fever set in, they did not have the force required 
to sustain the fort, much fewer operations in the Caribbean, and it had lasting effects on 
their responses to the Indians in North America. Pontiac’s rebellion strained the already 
overextended British force, and biological warfare likely proved to be the tactic required 
to quell the Native American uprising. Much like the empires in the previous chapter, 
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disease overtook a society and inflicted heavy losses to civilian and military populations. 
Indigenous societies’ inability to respond to the diseases the invading forces brought 
weakened them. It allowed the Great Powers to conquer and hold territory, reshaping the 
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V. TWENTIETH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL POWER 
RELATIONS AND GLOBAL COOPERATION 
This chapter will examine twentieth-century pandemics and the medical 
breakthroughs to combat disease’s effects on society by institutions and governments. 
Scientific advances and institutional infrastructure give researchers the ability to study and 
mitigate certain diseases unlike any time in history, creating a “technocracy” of disease 
control. The cases below suggest that disease in a globalized world can be both a motivation 
for collaboration and a device of GPC.  
The first case is the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic—arising in the concluding months 
of WWI—that engulfed the globe killing an estimated 50 million people.189 The health 
organizations formed post-hostilities led to revolutionary medical advances in disease 
transmission tracing and infection prevention still seen today. The second case is the 
international cooperation by the newly formed medical organization fighting and 
eradicating smallpox worldwide with the unlikely collaboration of two superpowers locked 
in a Cold War. The last case is the appearance of a novel disease—AIDS—and the world’s 
response, for better or ill. Taken together, this chapter charts both global cooperation 
against disease and the potential for nations to manipulate disease mitigation in ways that 
advance their interests. A country’s capacity to handle disease further delineates the plague 
gap in Balance of Power Theory. Twentieth-century technological and scientific advances 
give nations the ability to identify and possibly prevent mass outbreaks like never before. 
The act of preventing pandemics not only protects a nation’s power but establishes a field 
of GPC unto itself. 
A. THE GREAT WAR AND GREAT INFLUENZA: THE SPANISH FLU 
OUTBREAK (1918) 
Early in 1918, a pandemic began to sweep through the world—aided by natural 
virulence and troop and refugee mass movement—creating the most recorded disease event 
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in human history.190 The 1918 influenza outbreak threatened to unravel the international 
system.191 Yet, out of the Great Power conflict of WWI, the post-flu world witnessed the 
development of global cooperation designed to fight disease in all nations, not just the great 
powers. The subsequent research in response to the Spanish Influenza infection led to 
identifying the outbreak and created a path to fight future diseases.192 
In 1918, Haskell County, Kansas, experienced a strange outbreak circulating 
among Dr. Loring Miner’s patients.193 Influenza struck quickly with severe illness only 
hours after contraction, to death in the following days for dozens of cases. The isolated 
county contained the outbreak for the most part, but Camp Funston on Fort Riley, 300 
miles from Haskell County, was home to 56,000 troops training for WWI.194 The camp 
was the second-largest military base in America, and much like Greek and Roman 
settlements, the living quarters were ill-equipped to house the number of recruits and 
provide adequate heat and clothing.195 By late February 1918, the record cold winter took 
its toll on the camp, and three soldiers, two on leave and one recruit, became exposed to 
influenza—bringing it to Camp Funston.196 More than 1,100 soldiers required admission 
to the hospital within three weeks, and thousands more went to the base infirmaries—with 
the precise number not documented.197 Despite the severity of influenza, only thirty-eight 
men died, but the camp sent a steady flow of soldiers to other American bases and the war 
effort in Europe.  
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Disease often accompanies concentrated human activity and movement; the Great 
Influenza was no different. The U.S.’ entrance into WWI in 1917 required full engagement 
by the American people. Like American soldiers living in close quarters at Camp Funston, 
millions of factory workers crammed into the cities and lived in similar, tight quarters.198 
The mingling of so many people was a tinderbox for disease spread, and soon the flu was 
an epidemic in America. By April 1918, the flu reached the Western Front and developed 
into a pandemic.199 By June 29, 1918, Dr. Martin Salazar—a member of the Spanish 
Health Department—reported to the Royal Academy of Madrid about an unreported 
epidemic circulating in Spain.200 With no evidence in other countries, the term Spanish 
Influenza became attached. 
As with most other disease outbreaks in earlier chapters, several waves struck. By 
August 1918, the disease returned with even deadlier effects in France and made its way 
back across the Atlantic to begin a second wave in the U.S.201 The second wave spread 
quickly, first through the armies amassed in the European theater, then spread across the 
globe—a deadly side effect of the Great War.202 Doctors and nurses were away from 
civilian practices because of the war, which further impeded the response.203 Governments 
worldwide dealt with the rapid collapse of basic public services—healthcare, burials, and 
local government services—within a couple of weeks of the pandemic striking. By 1919, 
the influenza pandemic began to subside, but the outbreak left an estimated 50 million 
people dead worldwide compared to the estimated 20 million military and civilian deaths 
directly caused by WWI.204  
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The significant global death toll probably paved the way for scientific research to 
collect specimen samples for analysis, unlike previous epidemics in history.205 In the U.S., 
scientific advances in germ theory leading up to the war enabled researchers to understand 
and fight the virus. Dr. Paul Lewis of the Philips Institute in Philadelphia altered the 
traditional method of using animals for vaccine/serum testing instead of using blood from 
influenza survivors to develop a vaccine from the survivors’ antibodies.206 Despite 
medical advances, more outbreaks occurred, but the silver lining that emerged increased 
public health monitoring and services.207 
In previous chapters, disease has at times swung the power pendulum in favor of 
one group. However, in the Spanish Flu’s case, the pandemic’s high infection rate and the 
great powers’ engagement in WWI left little opportunity for nations to take advantage of 
each other’s weaknesses. True, the war’s conclusion led to a new order in which the U.S. 
emerged as a global power—albeit a reluctant one—superseding the Old-World Eurasian 
empires, but that transition was caveated by a sense of internationalism—of which disease 
control was a foundational component.208 President Woodrow Wilson led the U.S. into its 
new role, and the American problems had global ramifications.209 After WWI, the newly 
created League of Nations (which the U.S. refused to join)—designed to stabilize the 
international system—created its health organization and combined with the already 
existing anti-epidemic bureaus, which were the precursors of today’s WHO.210 The 
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League of Nations health branch dissolved at the onset of WWII, but after the war’s 
conclusion, the WHO emerged in 1948 as a separate, independent organization from the 
UN unlike its predecessor relying on a parent body.211 The WHO has been on the front 
line ever since, leading the global health agenda with cooperation among its member 
states.212  
The Spanish Influenza outbreak in 1918 swept across the globe—in the waning 
days of WWI—while the Great Powers battled in Europe. The worldwide epidemic 
required a global response to combat the pandemic—despite WWI pitting the Great Powers 
against each other. The League of Nations helped to stabilize international relations until 
the outbreak of WWII, but it did create the framework for present-day health systems.  
This health organization aims to fight disease in all nations, not just the superpowers. In 
this case, disease was an agent of great power exhaustion and the making of a truly 
international society. 
B. COMBATING DISEASE: GLOBAL COOPERATION FOR THE 
ERADICATION OF SMALLPOX IN THE COLD WAR 
The previous chapter highlighted the Spanish and British weaponization of 
smallpox for power advancement in earlier eras. Attempts to eradicate disease in the 
twentieth century are strife with questions of power and competition between nations. 
Smallpox has long been a feared disease and has ravaged society for millennia. Smallpox 
killed nearly 300 million people in the Twentieth Century alone. Ironically, as early as the 
1700s, the first vaccine ever was developed to protect humans from smallpox infection.213 
This technology (once refined), when combined with vaccination programs, health 
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organizations, and governments, virtually eradicated smallpox globally—by the 1980s.214 
The global cooperation to effectively eliminate smallpox—mainly through the 
organizations formed after WWI and WWII—demonstrates the opportunity to combat 
disease despite and/or because of global tensions. However, post-war hostilities and the 
newfound capability to control disease offer a new arena for international competition.  
An ancient disease, and often confused as a plague (bubonic), smallpox differs 
because survivors develop lifelong immunities.215 From the Plague of Athens, which 
appeared to spare the Spartans, to the Spanish unintentional use of smallpox to conquer the 
Aztecs, smallpox devastation spans throughout history. Despite the survivors gaining 
lifelong immunities, new births and global exploration allowed the disease to remain in 
circulation over many centuries.216 
Over the ages, societies attempted to gain immunity to smallpox, but it required 
infecting healthy individuals with the variola virus (a precursor agent that gives us cowpox 
and other poxes as well), which carried a significant risk of contracting smallpox.217 
Benjamin Franklin and many other parents in the 1700s avoided inoculation for fear of 
harming their children, and Benjamin Franklin says after the loss of his four-year-old son, 
“I long regretted bitterly, and still regret that I had not given it [smallpox] to him by 
inoculation.”218 It was not until the eighteenth-century English physician Edward Jenner 
used cowpox infections to produce immunity to smallpox without the danger of contracting 
the disease.219 After Jenner published the results, the new smallpox vaccination began to 
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circulate the globe to prevent smallpox. Historian William McNeill notes that organized 
medicine began to contribute statistically significantly to population growth for the first 
time, giving nations the power to control the disease.220 
In the 1950s, the Pan-American Sanitary Organization committed to eradicating 
smallpox throughout the Americas, and the WHO began calling for global smallpox 
eradication.221 The ongoing Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR initially hampered 
collaborative international efforts for eradication. However, policy shifts by the U.S. 
supported the WHO when the government witnessed the USSR’s successful smallpox 
eradication within its borders.222 The Cold War collaboration created a paradox, given 
superpower competition for influence in third-world countries—born from Cold War 
competition—that helped develop arguably one of the most successful partnership 
instances by superpowers in the Cold War history.223 This demonstrated that despite 
hostilities, global collaboration—despite international relations—can solve world health 
issues. It also uncovered the gain of power that comes with disease control. The elimination 
of smallpox occurred in all but four countries in the Americas by 1970.224 By 1980, nearly 
184 years after Edward Jenner first pioneered the cowpox inoculation in England, the 
WHA announced smallpox eradication globally.225  
Smallpox has devastated societies throughout the millennia of recorded history and 
altered the world—in terms of the balance of power—with each occurrence, from the fall 
of Athens, to the death of Marcus Aurelius that weakened the Roman Empire, smallpox 
has routinely modified the world order. Edward Jenner’s observations and the unlikely 
coordination between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War led to eradicating one 
of the deadliest diseases to ever occur on earth. The interest spurred by two superpowers 
led to global response and advancement of influence into countries unable to combat 
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disease. The international humanitarian cooperation provided the capability to fight disease 
for every nation. The power of disease remains evident, given the extent taken to fight it 
and exposed a scenario where disease could fuel a GPC in underdeveloped countries. 
C. THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY 
SYNDROME 
In 1980, reports arose of outbreaks of a mysterious disease with unusual infections 
and forms of cancer and pneumonia in otherwise healthy individuals.226 Initially, concerns 
were low in medical communities and national governments. The prevailing thought was 
that infectious disease had lost its power to alter affluent societies seriously.227 The WHO, 
its organizational predecessors, and global collaborations successfully mitigated influenza 
and eliminated smallpox. Once again, an international response would be required to fight 
another outbreak threatening to unravel some societies. The disease identified as AIDS— 
HIV is the virus which causes AIDS—differed from other diseases in controllability and 
the expense to mitigate the effects separated the developed and undeveloped countries with 
the WHO in the middle.228 Although not eradicated, the prevention education and medical 
treatment of AIDS gives another example of a global response and exposes the potential 
for rival powers to exploit disease by using national resources, for example, medical aid, 
to further their power in the international system. 
AIDS most likely originated in Africa, but the world’s connectedness facilitated its 
movement throughout the world similar to the Mongol Empire and the spread of the Black 
Plague throughout Europe.229 While initially confident in their ability to stem the disease, 
by 1982, public and medical professionals began to show the fear that accompanied pre-
modern epidemic outbreaks.230 AIDS was so much of a concern to the U.S. that the Central 
Intelligence Agency began to model infection predictions, and the chairman of the National 
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Intelligence Council, Fritz Ermarth, said: “This is one of those new-age issues, and nobody 
else is doing anything.”231 In 1986, after the realization AIDS might not be containable, 
the WHO proposed world strategies to combat the epidemic.232 However, political, social, 
and economic tensions rose over preventative program recommendations. In 1987, the 
advent of therapeutic drugs for AIDS further divided the world into nations that could and 
could not afford treatment.233  
When the WHO called for an AIDS response in the late 1980s, the global 
contribution was $44 million, and by 1990 the annual grant was $165 million, but this 
stagnated due to the program’s ineffectiveness.234 Finally, in 1996, the UN formed 
UNAIDS, which combined numerous centralized efforts into one collaborative global 
program, raising nearly $2.3 billion by early 2004.235 Despite this, many countries in 
Africa would not take action against AIDS because of the feared international stigma, 
discouraging research against AIDS.236 By 2000—twenty years since its discovery—
AIDS had infected over 53 million people and, by itself, was reversing the improvement 
in human longevity and economic growth in Africa.237  
Over time, the development of therapeutic drugs known as “cocktails” for AIDS 
has lessened or slowed HIV, but the cost has been high. For example, in the early 2000s, a 
triple cocktail in South Africa cost roughly $600 U.S. per month, with only an estimated 
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ten thousand of the four million-plus infected able to afford the treatment.238 Drug 
manufacturers argued the high cost of research and development determined the price 
needed to recoup their initial investment.239  
Despite the disparities, the G8 leaders pledged $60 billion to treat AIDS in 
developing countries.240 Once again, the Great Powers of the world aligned to address a 
global threat with a worldwide response. However, the wealth disproportion in the world 
left an opening for manipulation if global alliances did not ensure equal distribution of 
influence. Unlike previous international collaborations, the lack of resources in certain 
regions, political pressures, and commercial demands hindered the programs designed to 
assist the world.241 Countries with the wealth or systems to spread the cost—health 
insurance or government subsidies—greatly benefit from the high-cost drug manufacturers 
charge for treatments.  
The global response to AIDS shows the relevance of disease despite the medical 
advances in containment. Medical researchers had no cure, and treatment of AIDS, was 
costly leaving many regions in the world unable to afford the “cocktail” treatments. Nations 
with the resources to minimize and distribute AIDS treatment to those incapable provided 
an avenue for increased influence. The withholding of relief by a Great Power until certain 
conditions are met puts an impoverished nation at its mercy. Desperation can lead to 
irrational decisions during an epidemic, whatever the intentions of the Great Power behind 
the offer. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The cases considered in this chapter illustrate twentieth-century pandemics and the 
global efforts to combat their effects. Disease in a globalized world is not only an incentive 
for cooperation but can also be a tool of GPC. Medical breakthroughs allowed the world 
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to control diseases’ effects therapeutically and gave a chance for eradication. Affluent 
nations can influence impoverished regions and the opportunity to gain power in the area 
if not challenged by another authority.  
The Spanish Influenza outbreak in 1918 during WWI was the world’s first 
twentieth-century pandemic. Despite being consumed with war and its immediate after 
effects, the U.S. and other countries cooperated and distributed the knowledge gained from 
research. The cooperation led to multiple vaccines that lessened and prevented the spread 
of influenza. The creation of a global health organization—the WHO—to fight disease for 
the world and led to the improbable cooperation between the U.S. and USSR helping with 
smallpox eradication—eliminating one of the deadliest diseases in history. The AIDS 
pandemic occurring during the latter part of the twentieth century again displayed the 
global cooperation required to fight a pandemic. Still, globalization and privatization led 
to a disparity in a nation’s ability to respond without foreign intervention. The disparity 
caused by disease leaves underdeveloped countries vulnerable, prime targets of  influence 
by states with more resources. This is a familiar theme in the story of COVID-19, discussed 
in the following chapter.  
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VI. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PANDEMICS: 
A CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER? 
This chapter will examine two novel disease outbreaks that originated in China and 
their regional/global impacts. In both cases, the PRC’s ability to conceal and then contain 
the effects of disease within its borders while neighboring regions struggled created 
exploitation opportunities. Medical technology, healthcare availability, government 
control, and globalization have generated a system reliant on transnational assistance but 
susceptible to manipulation. Once again, the threat of a global disease in the interconnected 
world both incentivized cooperation and drove great power competition. Each case 
displayed how disease can alter a regional leader’s position when other nations cannot 
mitigate the effects of an outbreak.  
The first case, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, occurred 
in 2003, mainly in East Asia. The economic impact of SARS was briefly felt, but still left 
countries in the region vulnerable to Chinese influence. The second case is the ongoing 
2019 Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. The Chinese mitigated 
the effects of COVID-19 in their own country while other global powers struggled with 
containment, leaving a void in developing regions. This chapter highlights these diseases’ 
impacts on the international system when a great power can recover quickly from an 
outbreak and offer assistance. SARS and COVID-19 initially infected a nation, then 
spread—whether intentionally or not—requiring global cooperation to contain and combat 
the threats they posed. However, in both cases, China recovered quickly and then portrayed 
a message of strength and offered material assistance as its own form of GPC. The 
consequences of the initial handling of the pandemic by China and its effect on China’s 




A. AN EAST ASIAN EPIDEMIC: SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY 
SYNDROME OUTBREAK (2003)  
The SARS epidemic outbreak in 2003 and initially brought comparisons to the 
Spanish Influenza pandemic.242 Despite the infectiousness, SARS only infected 8,437 
worldwide, resulting in 813 deaths.243 Although mostly contained to East Asia, the 
political and economic impacts from SARS travel restrictions caused a recession in the 
region.244 The successful suppression of SARS and the economic cooperation that 
revitalized the area set the stage for a possible shift regional in power politics.  
The first case of SARS appeared in mid-November 2002 in Foshan, Guangdong. It 
quickly spread to several other nearby cities before rapidly spreading through different 
regions in China and then to 35 other countries within months.245 The world was put on 
notice when the Ministry of Health (MOH) of Canada uncovered rumors of a severe “flu-
like” outbreak in Guangdong and Beijing.246  
The WHO responded to the Canadian MOH’s information and dispatched a team 
to China for further investigation. However, the team was denied access and instead went 
to reported cases in Hanoi, Vietnam, to collect samples from a sickened individual with an 
unknown disease.247 The new strain—named SARS—led the WHO to issue international 
travel warnings since the disease seemed to be spreading along international air travel 
routes.248 Scientists in Hong Kong collaborated with the WHO and uncovered that the 
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disease did not respond to treatments proven effective against other diseases with similar 
symptoms, meaning the likelihood of discovering a vaccine was low.249  
Much like the late-twentieth-century outbreak of AIDS, the SARS outbreak needed 
a coordinated and effective global response. However, with SARS, near real-time 
information was updated as events unfolded—making this the first internationally 
spreading outbreak to be thoroughly, quickly reported on by such technological 
connectedness.250 Laboratories, clinicians, and epidemiologists located across the globe 
collaborated in virtual networks and allowed for sufficient, evidence-based information to 
be issued in real-time to help the WHO give warnings.251 By early July 2003, the spread 
of SARS was contained, but not because of medical advances. Instead, effective 
containment was achieved through a globalized effort by worldwide public health 
organizations using the medieval method of quarantine, which worked despite people’s 
global mobility.252  
The more relevant concern for the present was the Chinese misinformation that 
occurred around SARS. In late March 2003, Beijing Health Minister Zhang Wenkang 
reported only 22 confirmed SARS cases in Beijing, even though the PRC limited the 
weeklong national May Day vacation to only one day.253 China further attempted to 
downplay the outbreak by firing Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong and deputy party chief 
Zhang Wenkang for incompetence rather than deceit.254 Chinese Deputy Health Minister 
Gao Qiang said, “The Ministry of Health was not adequately prepared to deal with a sudden 
new health hazard…Accurate figures have not been reported to high authorities in a timely 
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manner.”255 Gao’s statement demonstrated the measures China was willing to take to 
preserve the party’s image.  
The sudden public firings and announcements to the globe were surprising, given 
the legal system in place to discourage the free flow of information.256 A United States 
Congressional report in 2003 resolved:  
It is likely that many of the government officials, reporters, and even 
average people in Guangdong who were aware of the potential threat posed 
by SARS in December and January kept quiet because they were also aware 
of the fate of the last person who spoke about a health crisis in the PRC: Dr. 
Wan Yanhai, who was detained in late August 2002 for disclosing a 
government report documenting the spread of AIDS in Henan province 
through contaminated blood. Authorities released Dr. Wan almost a month 
later after an enormous international outcry, but only after Dr. Wan signed 
a confession admitting he was guilty of revealing state secrets.257  
 
The spread of SARS was not just a threat to the Chinese, but to everyone the government 
interacted with without providing warnings about the severity of the outbreak.  
The economic effects were substantial. The WHO issued recommendations that 
produced fear and decreased consumer demand—especially retail sales and travel services 
closely linked to international travel.258 Tourism in the area fell by at least seventy percent 
when the WHO issued a general travel advisory on March 15, 2003.259 China and the 
surrounding region depend heavily on tourism from not only Asia but the United States 
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and Europe.260 It took until late April 2003 for the Chinese government to establish a 
publicized effort to combat the disease—primarily because of international pressures.261  
The outbreak occurred during unsettling world events, which further prepared the 
area for more significant Chinese influence. The 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq 
caused global uncertainty and further drove down travel worldwide during SARS.262 
During the Labor Day Golden Week’ holiday in May, the added travel restrictions caused 
an estimated loss of 40 percent of the total annual revenues of major tourism agencies in 
China.263 To combat the loss, Chinese and pan-Asian tourism panels collaborated to boost 
the region’s tourism sector once travel restrictions lifted in July 2003. This included special 
promotions and packages to airfares on specific routes within the area, greater cooperation 
between foreign countries and cities to spur travel, and donations by regional corporations 
ensured a recovery spurred by regional partnerships, but led by the PRC.264 When 
combined with the rapid economic growth occurring in the early 2000s, with the Asian 
region transitioning to become a more desired tourist destination and the short duration of 
SARS, this seemed to benefit China significantly.265  
The outbreak spanned only one fiscal quarter, decreasing China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) by one percent, while the GDP of Southeast Asia declined by half a percent 
on average.266 The outcome of SARS was better than expected for China and put the PRC 
in a favorable position over other Asian economies. The travel partnerships formed within 
the region increased the flow of tourism from China and other Asian countries and 
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outpaced the traditional majority of travelers, usually from the U.S. or Europe.267 The 
increased Chinese travel in the area created a scenario for expansion due to the absence of 
tourism from the west.  
 The global cooperation that arose to contain and stop SARS from infecting 
the world again highlights the importance of collaboration by world powers and offered 
opportunities for competition. Although the region experienced a recession, the short 
period of the SARS outbreak only stunted GDP briefly. The travel restrictions helped 
contain the disease but kept tourists away from America and Europe. Many of the countries 
in the infected region around China relied heavily on tourism and, post-SARS, the 
increased Chinese travel provided a much-needed boost. The collaboration with other 
countries in the tourism sector drove a quick rebound and the Chinese presence increased 
influence by way of donations and overall presence in the region. SARS could have become 
an international pandemic, but global efforts contained the outbreak to East Asia mainly. 
What might happen in the next outbreak of disease if Chinese deception leads to a 
worldwide pandemic? The COVID-19 outbreak might answer the question. 
B. 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS 
The exact source for the COVID-19 pandemic crippling the world is still a bit of a 
mystery, but the Chinese city of Wuhan is where the first confirmed case of the novel 
disease began in December 2019.268 COVID-19 quickly morphed into a worldwide 
phenomenon, and the WHO declared it a pandemic only two-and-a-half months after the 
outbreak began.269 The resulting global shutdowns sent governments and economies into 
turmoil. The subsequent strain on healthcare systems, misinformation campaigns, and 
international cooperation to fight back against the disease illustrated the need for a global 
partnership to fight a global disease. However, malign actors are using COVID-19 to 
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advance power because of their ability to contain and overcome COVID-19 illness effects 
and lockdowns designed to prevent the spread. The speed in the development of the 
COVID-19 vaccine is impressive and required to end the pandemic. The cooperation 
among governments and private corporations demonstrates how effective a globalized 
world can be for disease control. That said, the race to return to normalcy has created 
“vaccine nationalism,” like the HIV treatment inequality covered in Chapter Five, as 
countries choose whether to immunize their citizens first or distribute to the world.270 U.S. 
and EU hesitation in exporting the vaccine has created the opportunity for China to enhance 
its footprint in developing regions through assistance.271 
The infectiousness of COVID-19 struck fear into global populations worldwide and 
instilled worldwide lockdowns to prevent the spread.272 Dubbed the “new normal,” the 
shutdowns sent global economies spiraling downward as the world went into isolation.273 
The resulting decline reminded many analysts of the Great Depression of the 1930s in 
terms of GDP and unemployment, and the succeeding decline has created a power void 
prime for an ambitious country to seize.274 Despite efforts to combat the disease, it seemed 
to be spreading uncontrolled worldwide and overwhelming healthcare facilities within 
months of its discovery. To date (May 24, 2021), COVID-19—and its numerous 
mutations—has infected more than 166 million people and killed over three million people, 
but new studies suggest the death toll is twice as much as reported.275  
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The inability to control COVID-19 led to the disruption of public services and these 
abrupt interruptions forced governments to redistribute resources to fight the disease.276 
The measures designed to prevent the spread only put a further financial strain on an 
already burdened system. The outbreak forced leaders of the G-7 countries to have an 
emergency meeting in the early weeks of the pandemic to coordinate a response to the 
economic fallout of COVID-19.277 Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the economic outlook 
for developed and major economies was positive. However, the shutdowns put global trade 
at a standstill overnight and stunted any growth in the second quarter of 2020.278 It seems 
to be the only path to positivity is disease containment to spur economies back to life.  
However damaging the disease might seem, the country of its origin, China, used 
the COVID-19 crisis to position itself as a responsible world leader in the wake of 
disaster.279 The Chinese implemented extreme lockdowns to stop the spread of COVID-
19 in Wuhan.280 Travel was halted in and out of the city, and restrictions on residents 
prevented them from leaving their homes. Wuhan’s shutdown generated attention from the 
PRC leadership in Beijing and a team—led by Vice Premier Sun Chulan—was dispatched 
to the city and began damage control.281 Weeks earlier, Dr. Li Wenliang sent a message 
warning of a possible outbreak that resembled SARS in Wuhan, but he was quickly 
reprimanded about his statement and signed a testimonial that accused him of making false 
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statements that disturbed the public order.282 The Chinese mis-messaging to cover up the 
severity of COVID-19 had only just begun. 
Panels of Chinese medical experts—loyal to the party—dispatched to Wuhan 
reported false statements of transmissibility each time the world uncovered new facts.283 
Doctors’ messages into a disease early warning system were either obstructed or deleted to 
further the cover-up. The WHO requested the PRC to verify an outbreak of disease had 
occurred, but instead, the Wuhan Public Security Bureau responded it had “taken measures 
against eight law breakers and warned against manufacturing, believing, or spreading 
rumors.”284 Additionally, the Chinese government continued to underreport infection 
numbers, even once China acknowledged the extent of the outbreak. Despite all this, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Wuhan in March 2003 to declare victory over 
COVID-19, a propaganda message meant for the world, but the battle was still far from 
over within the country.285 The long-term effects of the initial handling by the Chinese 
remains to be seen.  
Communal outbreaks of COVID-19 occurred in numerous other provinces, and 
once detected, similar lockdowns to Wuhan went into place—affecting millions more 
around the country.286 This effort appeared to work, and within two months, the pandemic 
peaked, while across the globe, it was going generally unchecked.287 The control allowed 
PRC messaging officials to advertise the Chinese victory over COVID-19 and provide 
resources other world leaders—such as the United States—could not provide since most 
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were embattled with their own COVID-19 struggles.288 This strategy turned COVID-19 
into an agent of Chinese soft power. 
While other countries struggled to provide the supplies needed to fight a pandemic, 
China shipped N95 masks, protective suits, testing kits, ventilators, and loans to over 120 
countries as substantial evidence of Chinese success messaging.289 The Chinese 
government officials called the global response, “The most intensive and wide-ranging 
emergency humanitarian operation since the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949.”290 President Jinping said the Party must “tell China’s story well, spread China’s 
voice, and strengthen [China’s] narrative power internationally.”291 The openness of 
China’s ambitions has fueled a power competition amid a pandemic and possibly 
reordering the international system after the outbreak subsides. When combined with the 
United States’ early mismanagement of COVID-19, the consequence of “America First” 
foreign policy, and the openness of countries willing to accept China’s aid, the reshuffling 
of power and influence seems inevitable.292  
The COVID-19 pandemic might only be an inflection point in a shift already 
occurring in global influence by the Chinese. China launched the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) to connect China to Asia, Africa, and Europe along the historic Silk Road.293 The 
long-term economic strategy also includes health care initiatives, devising the “Health Silk 
Road,” China aims to provide health care assistance and financial incentives to 
underdeveloped and emerging countries.294 The strategy had so much of an impact that 
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WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said, “We can all learn something 
from China.”295  
Governments worldwide are investing in research, testing, production, and 
distribution systems to take control back from the disease. The United States President 
Donald Trump announced the effort named “Operation Warp Speed,” a joint public-private 
partnership initiated by the United States government, with the overall goal of cutting the 
typical timeline of years to develop a vaccine down to months.296 Amazingly, the global 
efforts have worked, and several vaccines are available with varying rates of efficacy.297 
Despite the ranges, the vaccine still provides hope to ending the pandemic. Along with 
other countries, the PRC developed a COVID-19 vaccine and prioritized the vaccine 
exports over domestic distribution, creating a “vaccine diplomacy.”298 China’s willingness 
to export its vaccine to Europe increased its clout in Europe, which struggled with 
pandemic and limited vaccine availability.299 For example, senior officials from Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and Serbia reiterated, “China was offering initial shipments of one 
million doses deliverable within days of signing a contract—a contract with Western 
companies typically deliver over months and whose shipments have seen delays in 
Europe.”300 
Regions beside Europe are benefiting from China’s vaccine diplomacy as well. 
China pledged to prioritize Mekong countries and other Southeast Asian countries with 
vaccines as early as August of 2020.301 The heightened United States-China tensions in 
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the region further politicized the pandemic and vaccine distribution. Cambodia’s Prime 
Minister accepted 600,000 vaccines from China despite the animosities from the country’s 
withdrawal from the international vaccine efforts and asked the public to disregard the 
origins of the vaccine.302 Other countries have followed suit; Thailand and Vietnam 
withdrew from the global cooperation called Covax to rely on China’s vaccine solely.303  
The rebranding of China has other effects on the international system and the global 
reordering. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the ideological change of some countries 
in response to disease and shows the fundamental importance of good governance, despite 
the type.304 All government types had their success and failures, but the Chinese model of 
control over the handling of COVID-19 is alluring to nations still struggling to control the 
pandemic.305  
The struggle cannot be more evident than with India as it confronts yet another 
surge of COVID-19 in the spring of 2021. The reluctance of the United States to provide 
aid to India forced Indian companies to seek deals with Chinese firms to import oxygen 
and personal protective equipment, giving the appearance that China was there to help 
another deserted American ally.306 Former Indian foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal 
commented about the aid, “There’s always a hidden agenda behind Beijing’s outreach in 
such matters. China wants to signal to India that America is not a reliable partner and drive 
a wedge between Delhi and Washington who share a good relationship.”307 The former 
Indian ambassador to Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Latvia further commented, “In a 
democracy, the government has to be mindful of public opinion. India would’ve played 
right into China’s hands if it had accepted its offer of help considering the latter is always 
on the lookout for domination on the geopolitical stage. Helping India in such a crisis would 
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have conveyed those optics.”308 The potential destabilization of the United States’ 
relationship with yet another ally further showcased the extent the Chinese will go to 
unbalance the international order. U.S. inattentiveness against a predictable threat—disease 
in this case—left a gap for destabilization and showed a weakness in American strategy.309 
Dr. John Arquilla and Dr. Nancy Roberts from the Naval Postgraduate School summarize 
the weakness by saying, “A good grand strategy must protect the people against microbes 
as well as missiles.”310 
The short-term effects on the international order caused by COVID-19 remain 
conditional. Current trends favor an increase in Chinese influence in Europe, Africa, and 
Asia by the BRI, the Health Silk Road, and their vaccine diplomacy. The United States and 
other nations’ mishandling of the pandemic left a void of influence, which China has filled 
with medical supplies, financial aid, and vaccine priority. In this case, China’s handling of 
the pandemic put it in a favorable position over other great powers. The apparent 
selflessness of China to export vaccines over the internal distribution of vaccines furthers 
its position as a solution to the problem. Until the pandemic subsides and the pandemic 
“new normal” is no more, it will be challenging to predict how the international order will 
fall, but signs point towards a realignment of power.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In both cases, a novel disease escaped from China because of global connectedness, 
and international cooperation turned the tide of the disease in the case of SARS. However, 
it still cannot be determined for COVID-19 yet. However, the power competition which 
emerged further fueled an ongoing struggle in power politics. The first, SARS, was 
contained regionally, while the second, COVID-19, astounded the world and became a 
global pandemic. Despite current medical technologies, globalization has connected the 
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world unlike any time in human history. The SARS outbreak mainly affected the Southeast 
Asian region, and China was there to profit from the region’s despair, gaining influence 
through cooperation strategies. With the COVID-19 pandemic, China recovered first and 
quickly began to export its narrative of containment and quelling of the outbreak. The 
mishandling of the pandemic by other great powers left a power void in developing regions, 
and China was more than willing to fill it with its vaccine diplomacy. The final outcome 
of the seating of the great powers is still debatable, but China has gained influence which 






The “plague gap” throughout the history of international relations exposed the 
critical exclusion of disease as a contributor to power shifts. The cases here reveal the 
underlying strain disease has put on the essential elements of power—military, economic, 
political, societal, and technological means and resources in the international system. This 
thesis identified the fundamental nature of disease as one of the variables in GPC, and one 
that has not received adequate attention given the stakes. 
A theme became evident about disease’s impact on national power during the 
course of this research: connectedness is both a source of power in the movement of people 
and goods and a liability in the spread of disease. Expansion drove trade and exploration 
into foreign lands and required the movement of troops to secure the voyages. Armies were 
exposed to novel diseases and unknowingly introduced them into the civilian population, 
often with disastrous effects. Disease has sometimes halted an empire’s expansion and 
signified slow decline.  
A. OBSERVED THEMES 
The lessons are not limited to older empires though. Several examples of epidemics 
in more modern times reveal this theme too. The global Spanish Influenza outbreak 
circulated by troop movements in support of WWI and the COVID-19 pandemic that 
spread to every continent in today’s globalized world demonstrate the theme of 
connectedness as a source of power and liability for disease.  
Another observed theme is that urbanization marks the development of empires—
the Roman Empire, for example—but is also a conduit for disease spread. As with the 
Athenians, Romans, and Byzantines, densely populated capitals and trade centers enabled 
the quick spread of disease. The combination of unsanitary conditions and medical 
insufficiencies incapacitated the empire’s ability to recruit new troops and adequately 
preserve the states’ status. Several of the case studies exhibit this theme. In the Athenian 
example, the onset of smallpox in the early years of the Peloponnesian War limited the 
resupply of troops and undermined a successful defense against the Spartans. The Romans 
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and Byzantines stretched their borders throughout Eurasia, but this required the movement 
of goods and troops, which provided a pathway for disease. The introduction of disease 
into the capitals stunted the expansionist thoughts and possibly began the decline of the 
empires. Another example is the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan and the thousands of citizens 
housed in close quarters. The populations were vulnerable to disease, and once introduced, 
the people were unable to maintain viable defenses. The introduction of disease into urban 
areas holds with recent disease outbreaks of SARS and COVID-19. 
Disease also affects power transitions by eroding human resources, occasional 
leadership death and societal chaos. The Athenians, Romans, Byzantines, Aztecs, British, 
Native Americans experienced manpower disruptions because of disease. The shortages 
hindered the groups’ ability to fill the military ranks because of disease and caused the 
eventual transfer of power in the region. In the case of Athens, the Romans, and the Aztecs, 
the death of charismatic leadership sent the empires into turmoil and destabilized them. 
The societal turmoil spans from the “Golden Age” of Athens to the most recent pandemic 
in this thesis—COVID-19.  
Disease may also be  used strategically as an offensive or defensive weapon to 
pursue or sustain power. In the Spanish conquistadors in Mexico and the British Army in 
North America, disease played a lead role in the power transition. The Spanish 
unknowingly introduced smallpox to the Aztecs, and the British knowingly introduced 
smallpox to the Native Americans. In each case, the defender could not overcome 
smallpox. Contrary to the previous offensive uses of disease, the Spanish in Cuba 
showcased the power of disease as a defense. The Spanish New World colonizers 
understood their immunities to yellow fever and designed their fortifications to greater 
expose the British to the effects of disease. The British might have realized the lessons 
learned from Havana and implemented the tactic against the Native Americans. 
Disease may either foster global cooperation or competition. The effort to eradicate 
smallpox saw the unlikely alliance between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War. 
The collaboration highlighted how effective the fight against disease could be if the Great 
Powers combined resources for the greater good. The smallpox vaccine diplomacy was a 
success story, and in large, smallpox has remained eradicated globally. The fight against 
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AIDS demonstrated another worldwide collaboration to eliminate disease. However, the 
potential competition to provide treatments for nations unable to afford the “cocktails” 
foreshadow the COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy employed by China today.  
Finally,  disease fighting narratives play a role in projecting success and power. In 
SARS and COVID-19, China isolated the disease outbreak and then exported a success 
storyline, which painted a positive picture of their handling of the situation, despite the 
back story. When combined with desperation from other countries engulfed in disease 
containment efforts, the best answer might not often be the correct answer in GPC. The 
struggle of the U.S. and the EU created a potential power transition to China. China had 
the will and ability to mitigate the pandemic. This provided an outlet for China to leverage 
influence over nations that had previously relied on the U.S. or EU for support.  
B. FUTURE IMPACTS OF DISEASE 
During this research, I have been fascinated by the impact of disease throughout 
history. The themes mentioned above all demonstrated the powerful effect of disease on 
power transitions. Each chapter introduced a new connection between disease and power 
filling the “plague gap.” As the thesis progressed, I was hard-pressed not to think of the 
U.S.’ position compared to other mighty empires and the outcome. Maybe China will 
surpass the U.S. after COVID-19. In the case of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, disease 
halted outward expansion and indicated decline. Can this happen to the U.S., or did it 
possibly start before COVID-19? Conceivably, the U.S.’ global influence had already 
declined. Did COVID-19 only accelerate the inevitable?  
All these questions are unanswerable right now, but the international order will 
become apparent as the dust settles. Future research will be needed once COVID-19 
concludes. The global position—in terms of influence—of each Great Power before and 
after COVID-19 will provide a clearer picture. Two effects seem probable: novel diseases 
will continue to infect societies; and how a nation responds to the impact of disease will 
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